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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Through this action, William Compton, John Simcox, and Saltair Investments,
L.L.C. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") seek to obtain coverage for a $1,000,000 judgment that
falls outside the plain and unambiguous scope of coverage provided by a professional
liability insurance policy. Plaintiffs filed this civil action and appeal against Houston
Casualty Company ("HC") based on HC's denial of coverage for non-party Robert
Seegmiller ("Seegmiller") with regard to a claim made under a professional liability
policy HC previously issued to Seegmiller's former employer, non-party Utah County
Real Estate, LLC ("Prudential"). Plaintiffs bring this claim against HC as Seegmiller's
assignees and judgment creditors, but their standing does not change the fact that there is
no coverage available under the applicable insurance policy because Seegmiller acted
outside the scope of his covered profession and his conduct is not otherwise covered
under the plain and unambiguous terms of the policy. As such, this Court should uphold
Judge Maughan's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of HC.

I.

PLAINTIFFS' UNDERLYING LAWSUIT
Approximately ten years ago, Plaintiffs invested over $1 million dollars into two

of Seegmiller's personal real estate development projects, one in Highland, Utah and the
other in Herriman, Utah.

Plaintiffs later learned that Seegmiller made material

misrepresentations to induce Plaintiffs to invest, which included Seegmiller's failure to
disclose his personal interest in both transactions.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed two

lawsuits, one for each project, to get their money back.

5

This case stems from an

•
underlying judgment in Civil No. 070916209, which relates to Seegmiller' s project in
Herriman, Utah ("Herriman Litigation"). 1
In the Herriman Litigation, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against two of
Seegmiller' s co-defendants, Sterling Barnes ("Barnes") and Valley View, L.L.C.
2

("Valley View"), on April 28, 2011 because the undisputed evidence showed that Barnes
and Valley View stole Plaintiffs' investment into the project and used the funds to pay
kickbacks to, among others, Seegmiller.

Days later, Plaintiffs moved for summary

•

judgment against Seegmiller because the undisputed evidence showed that Seegmiller
had a personal interest in the real estate deal and Seegmiller failed to disclose his conflict
of interest to Plaintiffs.
On October 18, 2011, Judge Toomey granted summary judgment in Plaintiffs'
favor with respect to their claim for theft against Barnes and Valley View and their claim

•
•

for negligence against Seegmiller. (A copy of Judge Toomey's decision is attached as
Addendum Exhibit 1.)

With regard to Plaintiffs' claim against Seegmiller, Judge

•

Toomey found that Seegmiller "owed certain duties to the Plaintiffs, which he breached
by failing to clarify his role in the transaction and failing to disclose a personal interest in
the transaction."

On June 7, 2012, Judge Toomey, based on her October 11, 2011

decision, entered a judgment in Plaintiffs'

favor and against Seegmiller for

$1,041,275.34.

1

Civil No. 070916208 relates to Seegmiller' s project in Highland, Utah ("Highland
Litigation") and is not at issue in this appeal.
2

Barnes was one of the principal members of Valley View.

6

•

•
II.

•

SEEGMILLER SETTLES WITH PLAINTIFFS
On May 29, 2013, Seegmiller entered into a settlement with Plaintiffs. As part of

that deal, Seegmiller assigned to Plaintiffs his alleged claims against ( 1) the other
defendants in the Herriman Litigation, (2) Prudential's insurance carriers (including HC),
and (3) Defendants Dan McDonald ("McDonald") and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC ("Smith
Hartvigsen"). 3

In exchange, Plaintiffs promised to eventually dismiss the remaining

charges against Seegmiller in the Herriman Litigation, which include causes of action for
fraud, theft, conspiracy, and negligent misrepresentation. To HC's knowledge, however,
those claims remain pending to this day.

III.

THE PRESENT ACTION
On September 13, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the present civil action against McDonald

and Smith Hartvigsen. On or about July 29, 2014, Judge Maughan granted Plaintiffs
leave to amend their Complaint, name HC as a Defendant, and allege a cause of action
for breach of contract against HC; Plaintiffs' claim against HC is based on HC's decision
to deny Seegmiller coverage for the Highland and Herriman Litigation under Prudential's
professional liability policy. 4
HC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 31, 2015 and Plaintiffs filed
a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on April 3, 2015. Judge Maughan held a hearing
on the Motions on August 13, 2015. Judge Maughan subsequently GRANTED HC's

3

Plaintiffs' claims against McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen do not relate to Plaintiffs'
claim against HC. As such, HC will not address them in this brief.

4

As noted above, coverage for the Highland Litigation is not at issue here.
7

•
Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety and DENIED Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment. (A copy of Judge Maughan's decision is attached as Addendum

•

Exhibit 2.) Judge Maughan found for HC because, under the applicable professional
liability insurance policy, I-IC "agreed to provide insurance coverage to Prudential, and its
real estate agents while providing Professional Services ' on behalf of Prudential, ' solely
in the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties,
for others for a fee."' Judge Maughan found that " [b ]ecause Robert Seegmiller had a

•

personal interest [in the Herriman Transaction], he held dual or competing roles in the
transaction giving rise to the Herriman Lawsuit. Robert Seegmiller cannot have held dual
or competing roles in the transaction and simultaneously have acted 'solely' as Plaintiffs'
real estate agent 'on behalf of Prudential." Judge Maughan also held that Plaintiffs, as
judgment creditors, cannot "obtain greater coverage than the HC[] Policies provide for
Robert Seegmiller."
STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.

THE UNDERLYING TRANSACTIONS
This case stems from Plaintiffs' investment of over $ 1 million into two real estate

development projects approximately ten years ago, one in Highland, Utah ("Highland
Transaction") and the other in Herriman, Utah ("Herriman Transaction"). There is no
dispute that Seegmiller introduced Plaintiffs to both projects and, at the time, was a
Prudential real estate agent. (R. 2586-87; 2776- 77, ,i,i 2-8; 2783-84, ,i,i 2-8; 2790, ,i 5.)
Apart from his work for Prudential, however, Seegmiller was also a property owner,
developer, manager, investor, and consultant.

8

The undisputed evidence, including

•

Seegmiller's and Plaintiffs' testimony, demonstrates that the Highland and Herriman
Transactions were two of Seegmiller's personal real estate projects. (R. 2617; 2625-27;

2635-36; 2807, ~ 5.)
The idea behind the Highland Transaction was that Plaintiffs, through a limited
liability company, would create a new development by purchasing a large piece of
property, subdividing it into lots, and selling off the individual lots. (R. 2588-89; 2596.)
Seegmiller stood to personally profit from the deal in a number of ways.

First,

Seegmiller joined the limited liability company Plaintiffs formed to purchase the
property. (R. 2590; 2598.) In addition, and unbeknownst to Plaintiffs, Seegmiller was a
member of a second, secret limited liability company that used Plaintiffs' down payment

•

to purchase the property at a lower price and "flip" it to Plaintiffs for a profit; that is,
Seegmiller had an ownership interest in the property on both sides of the transaction.
(R. 2596-97; 2623; 2631.) Given his self-interest, Seegmiller never told Plaintiffs about
his "flipping" limited liability company intermediary. (R. 2596-97.) Instead, he told
Plaintiffs that they were purchasing the property directly from "farmers." (R. 2586;

2589; 2596-97 .)

Seegmiller's unlawful conduct in the Highland Transaction is the

subject of the Highland Litigation, which remains ongoing. Plaintiffs are not seeking
coverage for the Highland Litigation through this appeal.
With respect to the Herriman Transaction, Plaintiffs agreed to purchase fortyseven lots from Valley View for $225,000 per lot under the belief that they "were
purchasing them at a price that it would allow those lots to then in tum be sold for a
profit." (R. 2593, p. 58:4-10. See also R. 2593-95; 2982-2989.) Plaintiffs paid Valley
9

•
View a $705,000 "refundable" deposit and agreed to pay the remainder of the purchase
price when the lots were developed and ready to be sold. The deal, however, never

•

closed because Valley View did not develop the lots. (R. 2594; 2603; 2607; 2982-89.)
When Plaintiffs demanded their deposit back due to Valley View's failure to develop the
lots, Valley View refused. (R. 2603.) Plaintiffs later learned that Valley View used
Plaintiffs' deposit to, among other things, buy the property for itself and pay off parties
who worked for Valley View. For example, Seegmiller received $165,000 for bringing
Plaintiffs' money into the deal and providing other management, development, and
consulting services to Valley View, Barnes, and their developer, Maxwell Real Estate

•

Development ("Maxwell"). (R. 2602-03; 2606; 2625; 2662; 5038-39.)
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs never acquired the Herriman lots and did not
know about Seegmiller' s relationship with Valley View, Barnes, and Maxwell when they
put their $705,000 into escrow. In Plaintiffs' own words, their decision to deposit the
funds was "a result of the fraud of Barnes and Seegmiller ...." (R. 2881, ~ 74. See also

•

R. 2594; 2603; 2982- 89.)

II.

THE UNDERLYING LAWSUITS
In November 2007, Plaintiffs filed two lawsuits to get back the money they

invested in the Highland and Herriman Transactions: Civil Nos. 070916208 and
070916209 (i.e. the Highland and Herriman Litigation). (R. 2815- 38.) Plaintiffs served
Seegmiller, who they named as a defendant in both lawsuits, with copies of the
Complaints on December 1, 2007. (R. 3089- 90.) Among others, Plaintiffs also named
Prudential, Seegmiller's fonner employer, as a defendant in both lawsuits. (R. 2815-38.)
10

•

•
McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen initially represented both Seegmiller and
Prudential in the Highland and Herriman Litigations. (R. 2619; 3197,

~

19.) Early on,

Seegmiller, Bruce Tucker, the owner and CEO of Prudential, and McDonald discussed
whether to submit the Claim5 to HC, Prudential's professional liability insurance carrier.
At Seegmiller's insistence, they did not submit the Claim. (R. 2669; 2792-98,

~~

12-34;

3230.)
Seegmiller was adamant that Prudential not submit the Claim to HC for several
reasons. First, Seegmiller acknowledged the Highland and Herriman Transactions were
his personal real estate deals. (R. 2807,

~

5.) Seegmiller worked on the Highland and

Herriman Transactions as a property owner, developer, manager and consultant; not as a
Prudential real estate agent. (R. 2617; 2625-27; 2635-36; 2807,

~

5.) In addition, and in

Seegmiller's own words, " there was no commissionable event." (R. 2625-26, pp. 65 :2366: 10.) Indeed, neither Seegmiller nor Prudential received a commission in connection
with either deal. (R. 2596; 2625-26; 2632; 5038-39.) Recognizing the Highland and
Herriman Transactions were his personal deals, Seegmiller actually volunteered to pay
for Prudential's defense because " this was [his] mess that [he] created and [he] wanted to
make sure that" Tucker and Prudential were not harmed. (R. 2659-60, pp. 373:21-374:3.

See also R. 2650; 2793-94,

~~

15, 18; 3231.) Seegmiller and Prudential consequently

5

While there are two separate lawsuits, HC treated the Highland and Herriman
Litigation as a single Claim because, under the terms of the Policy, "[o]ne or more
Claims based upon or arising out of the same Wrongful Act or interrelated Wrongful Acts
by one or more of the Insureds shall be considered a single Claim." (R. 2719, Section
VI(b ).)
11

•
defended the lawsuits themselves for more than two years before finally giving HC notice
of the Claim. During that same time period, they omitted any reference to the lawsuits
from policy renewal applications. (R. 2742; 2773; 2888-90; 5689.)
On January 21 , 2010, McDonald, on Prudential' s and Seegmiller's behalf, finally
notified HC of the Highland and Herriman Litigation. (R. 2888-90.) In the notice to HC,
McDonald confirmed the Highland and Herriman lawsuits included allegations that
Seegmiller was a principal in both deals and "part of a conspiracy that fraudulently
induced" Plaintiffs to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars. (R. 2888-90.)
On March 23, 2010, HC sent Prudential and Seegmiller its coverage position
letter, informed them that there was no coverage for the Highland or Herriman Litigation
under Prudential's professional liability policy, and reserved its right to deny coverage, as
the facts may warrant, on grounds other than those specifically set forth in its initial
coverage position letter. (R. 2892-2900.) HC also invited Prudential and Seegmiller to
provide any additional information that may be relevant to HC' s coverage analysis;
neither of them did. (R. 2892-2900.)
After HC confirmed there was no coverage, Seegmiller asked McDonald to write
"a letter to [Mr. Roundy] letting him know [Prudential and Seegmiller] were denied
coverage based on the fact there was no representation" of Plaintiffs in connection with
the Highland and Herriman Transactions. (R. 2643, p. 169:1-13. See also R. 3186-88.)
Months later, Seegmiller similarly instructed Judson Pitts, who succeeded McDonald as
Seegmiller's counsel in the Highland and Herriman Litigation, "to position [him] as

12

•

having no insurance and no money to cover a judgment." (R. 2644-45, pp. 176:4177: l l. SeealsoR. 3190-92.)

III.

•

THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT
On May 9, 2011, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment with respect to their

negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy claims against Seegmiller in the
Herriman Lawsuit.

•

Days earlier, Plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment with

respect to their theft, fraud , negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims against
Barnes and Valley View. (R. 2902-17.)
On October 18, 2011, Judge Toomey issued her decision on Plaintiffs' motions for
summary judgment.

She granted Plaintiffs summary judgment with respect to their

negligence claim against Seegmiller and held that regardless of whether Seegmiller acted
as Plaintiffs' real estate agent during the Herriman Transaction, which she detennined
was a question of fact, Seegmiller "owed certain duties to Plaintiffs, which he breached
by failing to clarify his role in the transaction, and failing to disclose a personal interest

in the transaction."

(R. 2909-11 (emphasis added).)

Judge Toomey also awarded

summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor with respect to their theft claim against Barnes and
Valley View. (R. 2911-13.) She held that Plaintiffs "demonstrated sufficient evidence to
prove the elements of theft. Mr. [Barnes] and Valley View unlawfully took the earnest
money, depriving the Plaintiffs of their property." (R. 2911- 13.)6

6

To HC's knowledge, Plaintiffs' fraud, theft, conspiracy, and negligent
misrepresentation claims against Seegmiller remain pending. (R. 2865-86; 2902- 17 .)
13

•
Following Judge Toomey's ruling, Plaintiffs threatened to pursue their remaining
claims against Seegmiller unless he assigned his alleged claims against, among others,

•

HC to them. For example, on April 17, 2012, Mr. Roundy wrote Mr. Pitts a letter and
stated:
If I pursue the negligence judgment against the E&O Policy
and Mr. Seegmiller's former attorneys, then the judgment will
never be more than a negligence judgment.

***
On the other hand, if that strategy fails to result in a complete
recovery for my clients, they will have no other option but to
proceed to trial. At trial, I will obtain judgments against Mr.
Seegmiller for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. Those
judgments will not be eligible for insurance coverage. . . .
This case will never end for Mr. Seegmiller unless he
reaches a settlement with us that prevents our claims
against him from going to trial.
(R. 2961-62 (emphasis added).)

•

On June 7, 2012, Judge Toomey, based on her October 11, 2011, decision, entered
a judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and against Seegmiller in the amount of $1 ,041,275.34.
The judgment consists of (1) $705,000, which reflects the exact amount Plaintiffs placed
into escrow to "hold the lots" in the Herriman Transaction, and (2) $336,275.34 in
interest. (R. 2594; 2603; 2920-21; 2982-89.)

IV.

THE UNDERLYING SETTLEMENT
Seegmiller subsequently entered into a settlement with Plaintiffs on May 29, 2013.

Under the terms of the settlement, Seegmiller assigned Plaintiffs his alleged claims
against ( 1) the other defendants in the Herriman Litigation, (2) McDonald and Smith
Hartvigsen, and (3) HC. (R. 2968-75.) Seegmiller also agreed to "assist [P]laintiffs in
14

•

the prosecution of [their] [c]laims by providing all reasonably requested assistance[.]"
(R. 2968-69.) In his own words, Seegmiller needed to placate Plaintiffs because he is
"not paying ajudgment against [him] plain and simple." (R. 2638, pp. 133:10-134:15.)

V.

THE POLICY
HC issued the relevant Professional Liability Errors & Omissions Insurance

Policy, Policy No. H707-16865 ("Policy" or "2007 Policy"), to Prudential with effective
dates of November 26, 2007 to November 26, 2008. (R. 2715 (a copy of the Policy is
attached as Addendum Exhibit 3).) Under the Policy's Insuring Clause, HC agreed to:
pay on behalf of the Insured any Loss and Claim Expense in
excess of the Deductible amount and subject to the Limit of
Liability as the Insured acting in the profession described in
Item 3 of the Declarations shall become legally obligated to
pay for Claim or Claims first made against the Insured during
the Policy Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an
Insured provided always that the Insured has no knowledge of
such Wrongful Act prior to the Inception Date of this Policy
and further provided that such Wrongful Act took place
subsequent to the Retroactive Date set forth in Item 8 of the
Declarations.
(R. 2716, Section I.)
The Policy defines an Insured as, among other things, " [a]ny partner, executive
officer, director or employee of the Named Insured while acting within the scope of their
duties on behalf of the Named Insured[.]"

(R. 2716, Section II(b).)

Independent

contractors are also covered under the Policy, "but only if the Professional Services of the
Independent Contractor(s) are the same as those set forth in Item 3 of the Declarations
Page and in Endorsement No. 1 ofth[e] Policy." (R. 2730.)
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The Policy is a professional liability policy. It clearly and unambiguously defines
the covered profession/professional services as (those) "[s]olely in the perfonnance of
services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others for a fee."
(R. 2715- 16; 2724.) Similarly, the Policy excludes coverage for "any claim [or] claim
expenses arising out of or connected with the performance of or failure to perform
services as an insurance agent, insurance broker, mortgage banker, mortgage broker,
escrow agent, property developer, builder, construction manager, or property manager" as
well as "any claim [or] claim expenses arising out of or connected with any transaction in
which any Insured has a direct or indirect beneficial ownership interest as a buyer or
seller of real property .. .. " (R. 2727- 28.)
Regardless of whether an Insured was acting within the scope of the covered
)

profession, the Policy excludes coverage for any Claim or Claim Expense " [b ]ased upon
or arising out of any dishonest, criminal, fraudulent, malicious or intentional Wrongful
Acts, errors or omissions committed by or at the direction of the Insured." (R. 2717,
Section IV(a).)
In the event of a Claim, the Policy requires Insureds to "immediately forward to
the firm named in Item 6 of the Declarations every demand, notice, summons or other
process received by the Insured or his representative." (R. 2720, Section VIII(a)(2).)
In addition to the 2007 Policy, HC also issued Prudential professional liability
policies in 2006 and 2008. Those policies contain the same material provisions as those
found

m

the

2007

Policy,

including

Insuring

Clauses,

definitions

profession/professional services, and exclusions. (R. 2685-712; 2745-73.)
16
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm Judge Maughan's decision to grant HC's Motion for
Summary Judgment because the undisputed facts show that Seegmiller was not acting
within the scope of his covered profession during the Herriman Transaction; thus, there is
no coverage under the Policy. The Policy, through its plain and unambiguous terms, only
provides coverage for Prudential real estate agents while they are acting "solely" as real
estate agents/brokers "on behalf of' Prudential and "for a fee." There is no dispute that
Seegmiller held an undisclosed, personal interest in the Herriman Transaction and
received a $165,000 kickback from stolen funds in exchange for his work as a consultant,
developer, and property manager on behalf of Valley View, Barnes, and Maxwell. That
is, as Judge Maughan held, Seegmiller did not "act[] 'solely' as Plaintiffs' real estate
agent 'on behalf of' Prudential" and thus did not act within the scope of the profession
covered by Prudential's Policy.
Even if this Court is not persuaded that Seegmiller' s personal interest in the
Herriman Transaction took him outside the scope of the covered profession as a matter of
law, this Court should nevertheless affirm Judge Maughan's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of HC on alternative grounds.
This Court may affirm Judge Maughan's decision because the undisputed
evidence shows that Seegmiller' s self-dealing was not the type of conduct Prudential and
HC intended to cover under the plain terms of the Policy's Insuring Clause. In addition
to only providing coverage for individuals acting "solely" as real estate agents/brokers,
the Policy also only provides coverage for real estate agents acting "on behalf of'
17

Prudential who receive or expect to receive a "fee."

There is no question that the

Herriman Transaction was Seegmiller's personal deal; Prudential was never going to
receive any fees from the proposed, failed transaction.

That is, it cannot be said

Seegmiller participated in the deal " on behalf of' Prudential.

Similarly, Seegmiller

•

simply did not receive or expect to receive the type of professional "fee" necessary to
trigger coverage. Prudential insurance agents are paid one way: by commission. It is
undisputed that P laintiffs never paid and never intended to pay Seegmiller a commission
in connection with the Herriman Transaction. It is also undisputed that the only payment
Seegmiller received or expected to receive in connection with the Herriman Transaction
was his $165,000 kickback, paid out of Plaintiffs' stolen funds. That secret payoff is not
the type of "fee" that triggers coverage under the Policy. Because Seegmiller's conduct
is not covered under the Policy's Insuring Clause, there is no coverage.

In addition, the Court may uphold Judge Maughan's decision because the Policy
excludes coverage for dishonest acts, and Plaintiffs' Claim and judgment are based on
Seegmiller's deceitful conduct. While Plaintiffs argue there must be coverage because
they have a judgment against Seegmiller for "negligence," this Court should follow the
long-held principal that the underlying facts, not the title of the legal theory applied,
determine whether coverage exists.

When this Court reviews the undisputed facts,

including Plaintiffs' own testimony, it will become apparent that Seegmiller acted
dishonestly, which negates any coverage available under the Policy.
Finally, this Court may uphold Judge Maughan's decision because Seegmiller
waived any right to coverage and would be estopped from seeking coverage now.
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Seegmiller and Prudential withheld notice of the Claim from HC for years, did not
disclose the litigation on policy renewal applications, and never challenged HC's decision
to deny coverage.

Given such actions, Seegmiller would be barred from seeking

coverage now under the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.

As Plaintiffs stand m

Seegmiller's shoes, they similarly cannot recover under the Policy at this late date.
HC does not challenge Plaintiffs' standing to bring this action as either judgment
creditors or Seegmiller' s assignees.

Whether Plaintiffs stand before this Court as

judgment creditors or assignees, however, is irrelevant.

Simply put, Plaintiffs cannot

obtain greater coverage than would otherwise be available to Seegmiller. Judge Toomey
specifically found that whether Seegmiller was even acting as Plaintiffs' real estate agent
during the Herriman Transaction is a question of fact, negating any possibility that
coverage exists as a matter of law. More importantly, and for the reasons discussed
above and addressed more fully below, the undisputed facts actually reveal there is no
coverage available for Seegmiller under the plain and unambiguous terms of the Policy as
a matter of law.

As such, Plaintiffs cannot use the Policy to fund their underlying

judgment.
For these reasons, this Court should affirm Judge Maughan's decision to grant
summary judgment in favor ofHC.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE 2007 POLICY APPLIES.
The 2007 Policy applies because the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs did

not serve Seegmiller with copies of the Complaints in the Highland and Herriman
19

Litigation until December 2007. The three professional liability policies HC issued to
Prudential (in 2006, 2007, and 2008) are "claims made" policies.

As such, the date

Plaintiffs made their Claim against Seegmiller controls which policy applies.

Lands, Inc. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1993).

AOK

Under the

policies, a Claim is defined as "a demand received by the Insured for compensation of
damages, including the service of suit .... " (R. 2717 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs have
offered no evidence to show Seegmiller received a demand prior to November 26, 2007.
Rather, Plaintiffs admit that Seegmiller was served with copies of the Complaints on
December 1, 2007. As such, the 2007 Policy applies.
The question of which policy applies, however, is essentially a non-issue because
Prudential's three HC professional liability policies contain the same material provisions.

II.

THE COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE POLICY TO EFFECTUATE
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
A.

The Policy's terms are plain and unambiguous.

This Court should interpret the Policy according to its plain and unambiguous
terms. HC agrees with Plaintiffs that " [w]hen interpreting an insurance contract, the
Court must read the policy as a whole and attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of
its provisions." (Plaintiffs' Br., p. 35.) HC also agrees that " [a] construction which
contradicts the general purpose of the contract or results in hardship or absurdity is
presumed to be unintended by the parties." (Id. at p. 34.) Indeed, words should be
interpreted "' according to their usually accepted meaning and in light of the insurance
policy as a whole."' Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Sorensen, 2013 UT App 295, ,i 11 ,
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362 P.3d 909 (quoting Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47,
685).

~

5, 980 P.2d

"'If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the

parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language."'

Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Unigardins. Co., 2012 UT 1, ~ 16,268 P.3d 180 (quoting Benjamin
v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, ~ 14, 140 P.3d 12 10).
Given these basic principles of policy construction, this Court should disregard
Plaintiffs' call to interpret the Policy " in a way that provides the most broad potential
coverage to Prudential and Seegmiller that the Policy will allow by its interpretation."
(Plaintiffs' Br., p. 36.) Such a request, on its face, actually begs the Court to ignore Utah
law and distort the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Policy. Notably, Plaintiffs
have never alleged that any Policy provisions or terms are ambiguous or provided a legal
basis for construing the Policy according to anything other than its plain and
unambiguous terms.

Those terms reveal the true intent of the parties and must be

honored.
B.

The Policy does not provide coverage for Prudential's real estate
agents' personal real estate deals.

Judge Maughan properly granted HC's Motion for Summary Judgment because
the undisputed evidence shows that Seegmiller's conduct in the Herriman Transaction is
not covered under the Policy's Insuring Clause. In an insurance coverage dispute, the
insured has the burden to prove it suffered a loss covered by the policy's insuring or
coverage provision. Young v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 2008 UT App 114,
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25-28, 182 P.3d

911; Morris v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co., 500 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1972). Here, the
Policy' s Insuring Clause provides coverage when the:
Insured acting in the profession described in Item 3 of the
Declarations shall become legally obligated to pay for Claim
or Claims first made against the Insured during the Policy
Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an Insured provided
always that the Insured has no knowledge of such Wrongful
Act prior to the Inception Date of this Policy ....
The Insuring Clause incorporates several definitions by reference that further
clarify the scope of coverage available, including, most importantly, the definition of the
Insured's Profession, as found in Item 3 of the Declarations Page, which refers to
Endorsement 1. Endorsement 1 identifies the Insured's Profession, the only profession
for which the Policy provides coverage, as "[s]olely in the performance of services as a
Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others for a fee." That is, the
performance of any non-covered professional services, including property management,
development, and consulting, takes an individual outside the scope of the covered
profession because (s)he is not acting exclusively as a Prudential real estate agent or
broker. The same holds true if an individual does not receive or expect to receive a
professional "fee" or holds an ownership interest in the property. 7

Simply put, an

individual is not covered under the Policy unless (s)he "checks off' each of the specific
criteria that define the covered profession. See Walston v. Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of

Pittsburgh., Pa., Nos. 3:09-CV-112-AC, 3:10-CV-579-AC, 3:10-CV-6126-AC, 2012 WL

7

As discussed above, it is undisputed that Seegmiller held an ownership interest in the
Herriman property. Plaintiffs are not seeking coverage for the Highland Transaction in
this appeal.
22
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2049451, at * 19 (D. Or. June 6, 2012) (" [T]he specific language of the Endorsement
limits coverage to [Investment Advisor Representatives] only when they are acting solely
in their capacity as an [Investment Advisor Representative] and then provides a specific
definition for [Investment Advisor Representative] that requires those [Investment
Advisor Representatives] to meet other requirements established by State Farm."); Hirani
Eng'g & Land Surveying v. Mehar Inv. Grp. LLC, No. 09-252-RGA, 20 12 WL 917566,

at *l (D. Del. March 19, 2012) ("Were there no limitations on the term ' Professional
Services,' it would appear that the work of a professional engineer or environmental
•

engineer would fall within the ordinary understanding of the term. Since the contract
narrowed the definition of ' Professional Services,' it is necessary to consider what the
contract covered with the more limited definition.").
As discussed more fully below, the undisputed facts show that Seegmiller (1) did
not act "solely" as a real estate agent during the Herriman Transaction, if at all, (2) did
not act "on behalf of' Prudential, and (3) did not receive a " fee." As such, and pursuant
to the plain and unambiguous terms of the Policy, there is no coverage.

Ill

SEEGMILLER HELD A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE HERRIMAN
TRANSACTION.
This Court should affirm Judge Maughan's ruling that Seegmiller's personal

interest in the Herriman Transaction negates any potential for coverage under the Policy
because it took him outside the scope of the covered profession. The Policy's plain and
unambiguous terms, including its specific definition of the covered profession, establish
the criteria an individual must meet to be covered under the Policy. If an individual does
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not meet the criteria, there is simply no coverage available. See Walston, 2012 WL
2049451, at *19; Hirani, 2012 WL 917566, at *1.
The policy language and facts in Walston are particularly helpful in demonstrating
how a professional liability policy may refine the scope of coverage provided through the
use of a specific definition of the covered profession. In Walston, the plaintiffs were
underlying judgment creditors ("Garnishors") who obtained limited judgments against a
State Farm agent (McCoy) for "negligence" based on representations McCoy made to get
the Garnishors to invest in a real estate development company, Willamette Development
Services, LLC.

Walston, at * 1-5.

After obtaining their judgments, the Garnishors

brought suit against McCoy's State Farm professional liability insurer (National Union),
alleging their damages were "based on claims that McCoy was negligent with respect to
investment advice she gave them and that McCoy's conduct f[ell] within the terms of the
Policy." Id. at *7. There was no dispute that McCoy was, at all relevant times, employed
as a State Farm agent and certified to sell State Farm securities. Id. at *3. Willamette,
however, was one of McCoy's "outside business activities." That is, her brother started
the company, she received compensation dfrectly from Willamette for services she
provided, and Willamette investment documents revealed McCoy held an ownership
interest in the company. Id. at *4-5. Thus, the question before the Court was whether
the express terms of State Farm's professional liability policy provided coverage for
McCoy's personal ventures.
Like Prudential's Policy, the State Farm professional liability policy at issue in

Walston specifically defined the covered profession; the State Farm policy only provided .
24
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coverage for "Wrongful Act[s] committed by [an] Investment Adviser Representative

•

solely while acting in his/her capacity as such." Id. at *7 (emphasis added). 8 The Court
determined the policy was clear and unambiguous, providing that "an IAR must be acting
exclusively on behalf of, and for the benefit of, State Farm to be covered by the [p]olicy."

Id. at *22. Given the clear language of the policy, the Court found there was no coverage
for the Garnishors' underlying judgments because "McCoy was acting on behalf of, and
for Willamette in promoting and recommending that Gamishors invest in Willamette.
Even if, as Garnishors argue, McCoy was also soliciting potential clients for her State
Farm business, that secondary purpose does not change that McCoy was working for
Willamette at all times in question, and primarily so." Id. That is, the Court found that
McCoy was acting outside the scope of the profession covered by the express terms of
the State Farm policy while working for Willamette, even if there was some potential
benefit to State Farm.
Prudential's Policy only provides coverage for Insureds "solely in the performance
of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others for a fee."
If an individual is not acting "solely" as a real estate agent/broker, (s)he is not acting
within the covered profession. The term "solely" means "to the exclusion of all else."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/solely (last visited

8

The State Farm policy also specifically defined the term "Investment Adviser
Representative" ("IAR"). Id. at *7-8.
25

Apr. 12, 2016). 9 Its synonyms include: exclusively, just, and only. Id. See also Plank-

Greer v. Tannerite Sports, LLC, 102 F.Supp.3d 954, 957 (N.D. Ohio 2015) ("The term
'only' modifies the phrase 'with respect to the conduct of the business,' thereby expressly
limiting the insured's coverage to conduct that relates solely to the insured's business.
Activities that are mixed in nature-done for both business and pleasure-or activities
unrelated to the business, are outside the policy's scope."). Thus, as in Walston, the
Policy provides no coverage for Seegmiller's personal business pursuits, even when there
was some theoretical, tangential benefit to Prudential.
The undisputed facts show that Seegmiller did not participate in the Hen-iman
Transaction "solely" as a Prudential real estate agent.

Seegmiller himself admits the

Hen-iman Transaction was his personal real estate deal; he worked on the deal as a
property developer, manager, and consultant and received a $165,000 kickback for his
efforts, which was taken out of Plaintiffs' stolen funds. Plaintiffs similarly acknowledge
that Seegmiller held a personal interest in the Hen-iman .Transaction.

Indeed,

Seegmiller's secret, personal alliance with Valley View, Barnes, and Maxwell was the
basis of Plaintiffs' underlying suit, and Plaintiffs have continuously emphasized that they
wish they had known Seegmiller had a conflict of interest and "was being paid a large
undisclosed fee ... for bringing [them] and [their] money to the transaction" prior to
placing their deposit. (R. 2779,

~

23; 2786,

~

23.) Judge Toomey found Seegmiller was

Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Sorensen, 2013 UT App 295, ~ 11, 362 P.3d 909 ("As we
would for contract language, we 'interpret words in insurance policies according to their
usually accepted meanings and in light of the insurance policy as a whole." ') (citations
omitted).
9
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liable for Plaintiffs' losses because he " fail[ ed] to clarify his role in the transaction, and
fail[ ed] to disclose a personal interest in the transaction."

(R. 2909-11.)

In short,

everyone acknowledges Seegmiller held a personal interest in the Herriman Transaction.
As it cannot be said that Seegmiller acted "solely" as a Prudential real estate agent, if at
all, Seegmiller was not acting within the Policy's covered profession. That means there
is no coverage under the plain and unambiguous terms of the Policy.
This Court should reject Plaintiffs' plea to read the Policy as providing coverage
for acts that are " unrelated to the covered activity for which the insurance policy was
purchased." (Plaintiffs' Br., p. 37.) As an initial matter, such a construction would ignore
the clear language of the Policy, which unambiguously defines the scope of the covered
profession (i.e. "solely in the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker ...

."). See Walston, 2012 WL 2049451 at * 19 ("It would be objectively unreasonable to
construe the language of the Policy, and the Endorsement, to provide coverage for IARs
no matter who they are representing or benefitting."); Plank-Greer, 102 F.Supp.3d at
957. Moreover, Plaintiffs provide no support, in law or fact, to support such a broad
construction. There is no evidence to suggest either Prudential or HC intended to provide
coverage for Prudential's real estate agents when they were pursuing their personal
interests, and the only cases Plaintiffs cite are inapplicable. The policies in TM v. Exec.

Risk Indem. Inc. and Jarvis Christian Coll. v. Nat 'l Union Fire Ins. Co. used the word
"solely" to define Wrongful Acts - neither policy used the term to define the scope of the
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covered profession. 10 In addition, the insureds in TM and Jarvis argued the policies'
definitions of "Wrongful Act" were ambiguous. 59 P.3d 721, 725 (Wyo. 2002); 197 F.3d
742, 751 (5th Cir. 1999). 11 Plaintiffs have never alleged that any provision of the Policy,
let alone the definition of the covered profession, is ambiguous. Indeed, its terms are
clear and reveal Prudential's real estate agents are not covered if they have a personal
interest in a transaction because they cannot be acting "solely" as real estate agents on
behalf of Prudential in such situations.

Thus, Seegmiller's personal interest in the

Herriman Transaction, which is at the heart of Plaintiffs' Claim and judgment, negates
any potential for coverage
IV.

THE COURT MAY AFFIRM JUDGE MAUGHAN'S DECISION ON
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS.
Even if this Court is not persuaded that Seegmiller's undisputed personal interest

in the Herriman Transaction entitles HC to judgment as a matter of law, this Court should
affirm Judge Maughan's decision on one of several alternative grounds.
A.

Seegmiller's conduct is not covered under the Policy's Insuring Clause.
1.

Seegmiller did not act "on behalf or' Prudential.

The Policy provides no coverage for the Herriman Transaction because Seegmiller
did not act "on behalf of' Prudential. Contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, Seegmiller's

10

The Court in Walston specifically found the policies in TM and Jarvis were "easily
distinguishable" because the policies in those cases used the term "solely" in their
definitions of "Wrongful Act" and not to define the scope of the covered professions.
Walston, 2012 WL 2049451 at *20.
11

The policy in TM did not even define the covered profession ("psychologist"). 59
P.3d at 723, 725.
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status as a Prudential employee/independent contractor 12 does not automatically make
him an Insured. Rather, Seegmiller was only insured under the Policy when acting "on
behalf of' Prudential. (R. 2716, Section II(b).) That is, there is no coverage if the Claim
relates to work Seegmiller performed to further his own self-interests. Walston, 2012
WL 2049451 at *22 (finding there could be no coverage unless the alleged Wrongful Act
was committed by the individual while acting "exclusively, ,on behalf of, and for the
benefit of' the named insured). See also Berry & Murphy, P. C. v. Carolina Cas. Ins.

Co., 586 F.3d 803, 814-15 (10th Cir. 2009); Farr v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 61
F.3d 677, 681 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he proper inquiry is whether Farr and Markley
were acting on behalf of the corporation (as opposed to themselves) when they engaged
in the alleged behavior.") ( emphasis added). Given the plain language of the Policy and
relevant case law, Plaintiffs' contention that "the coverage provision requires coverage
for any negligence committed by Seegmiller when acting within the real estate
profession"

13

is misplaced. For example, Plaintiffs would not argue the Policy provides

coverage if Seegmiller performed services as a real estate agent for another brokerage.

12

Seegmiller's status as an employee or independent contractor is irrelevant with respect
to the coverage analysis since employees and independent contractors are subject to the
same Insuring Clause, definitions (including the definition of the covered profession),
and exclusions. (R. 2730 ("It is further understood and agreed that the Independent
Contractors, of the "Named Insured", are covered solely for their Professional Services
provided on behalf of the Insured; but only if the Professional Services of the
Independent Contractor(s) are the same as those set forth in Item 3 of the Declarations
Page and in Endorsement No. 1 of this Policy.").) As such, HC will not address whether
Seegmiller is more properly classified as a Prudential employee or independent
contractor.
13

(Plaintiffs' Br., p. 41.)
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Similarly, by its plain and unambiguous terms, the Policy provides no coverage for

•

Seegmiller's personal deals.
The undisputed evidence shows that Seegmiller did not participate in the Herriman
Transaction "on behalf of' Prudential. Again, Seegmiller's admissions are telling: he
testified that he acted solely in the role of developer and not as a Prudential agent.
(R. 2627-28, pp. 76:21-77:7.)

It is also undisputed that because the Herriman

Transaction was Seegmiller' s personal real estate deal, neither Seegmiller nor Prudential

•

ever entered into a service contract with Plaintiffs or received a commission in
connection with the proposed deal. Prudential's name is also noticeably absent from the
relevant Real Estate Purchase Contract, and it was Barnes, not Seegmiller, who placed
Seegmiller's name on that document. (R. 2982-89; 5037.) 14 Seegmiller volunteered to
pay for Prudential's defense in the Herriman Litigation and requested that McDonald
withhold notice of the Claim from HC for a reason, and it was certainly not because
Seegmiller wanted to be personally liable for a $1 million ju_dgment.

(R. 2659-60,

pp. 373:21-374:3. See also R. 2650; 2793-94, ,, 15, 18; 3231.) Rather, Seegmiller
recognized the Herriman Transaction was his personal deal and he should take

14

Barnes told Plaintiffs' counsel that Seegmiller:

wasn't making any commission on it there was no commission on
that transaction I think I was the one who ended up writing his
name on the REPC and my agent's name on the REPC just because
I thought you had to have somebody in each of those spots but
neither of those agents were actually making any commission in the
transaction it was just a document that they provided for us.
(R. 5037 (emphasis added).)
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responsibility. Because it was Seegmiller's personal deal, there is no coverage under the

•

Policy.
2.

Seegmiller did not receive or expect to receive a "fee" that would
trigger coverage under the Policy.

Barnes and Valley View stole Plaintiffs' money, and Seegmiller' s receipt of a
$165,000 kickback from those stolen funds cannot trigger coverage under the Policy.
The parties agree that the Policy provides no coverage unless Seegmiller received or
expected to receive a "fee" in connection with the Herriman Transaction. As the term
"fee" is not defined, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, which is " [a]
charge for labor or services, especially professional services." Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas.
Co. v. Sorensen, 2013 UT App 295,

•

~

11, 362 P.3d 909 ("As we would for contract

language, we 'interpret words in insurance policies according to their usually accepted
meanings and in light of the insurance policy as a whole"') (citations omitted); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 309 (4th pocket ed. 2011). Plaintiffs cite no authority to suggest the
term "fee" is ambiguous or that it should be defined in any other way.
Several undisputed facts reveal Seegmiller did not receive or expect to receive a
"fee" in the Herriman Transaction that would trigger coverage.
insurance agents are paid in one way: by commission. (R. 2993,

~

First, Prudential
13; 3022.) Second,

Seegmiller and Barnes agree that Seegmiller's $165,000 payment was not a commission.
(R. 2625-26; 2632; 5038-39.)

Barnes emphasized that fact in a conversation with

Plaintiffs' counsel:
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Barnes: I didn't think there was an agent there was no
commission as far as someone representing someone and
getting paid there wasn't anybody

•

Roundy: Right you knew that because you would have been
the one paying the commission as the seller so you weren't
Barnes: Yeah
Roundy: As far as what his relationship was with Bill
[Compton] and John [Simcox] did you have an impression
one way or the other about .whether he was representing them
or why was he involved in the communication if he wasn't
acting in some role on their behalf

•

Barnes: Well I didn't think he was their agent no and I
understood he was going to get some management fees from
the management company for putting the deal together but
nothing beyond that no agent buyer relationship.
(R. 5038-39 (emphasis added).) Third, Seegmiller never received or expected to receive

a commission from Plaintiffs, his alleged clients, in connection with the Herriman

•

Transaction. Fourth, no portion of Seegmiller's $165,000 kickback went to Prudential. 15
Fifth, Seegmiller's kickback was paid out of stolen funds. (R. 2911-13.) Finally, the

illegal nature of Seegmiller' s kickback was the basis of Plaintiffs' underlying lawsuit and
judgment. Given these facts, Seegmiller simply never received or expected to receive a
professional "fee" for services he allegedly provided Plaintiffs.
This Court should reject Plaintiffs' argument that Seegmiller's $165,000 kickback
is the type of professional "fee" that triggers coverage under the Policy. In an effort to

15

Under Utah law, real estate commissions belong to the brokerage (i.e. Prudential).
UTAH ADMIN CODE R. 162-2f-40la(15)(b). So, even if the $165,000 payment to
Seegmiller could be classified as a "commission," which HC refutes, it was unlawful for
Seegmiller to keep the money all to himself.
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create coverage where none exists, Plaintiffs now contend Seegmiller received his payout
in accordance with common real estate practices. (Plaintiffs' Br., p. 38.) That position,
however, directly contradicts Plaintiffs' prior statements and arguments. In addition to

•

the facts discussed above, Plaintiffs' own testimony evidences the fact that Seegmiller's
kickback was anything but common, as they stated that " [i]t would have ... been very
material for [them] to know that Mr. Seegmiller was being paid a large undisclosed fee
by Valley View for bringing [them] and [their] money to the transaction .... " (R. 2779,
~ 23; 2786, ~ 23.) Judge Toomey agreed when she held that Seegmiller was liable for

"failing to clarify his role in the [Herriman] [T]ransaction, and failing to disclose a
personal interest in the transaction." (R. 2909-11.) Even Plaintiffs' counsel admits that
Seegmiller's "secret commission" was not a standard real estate commission. (R. 7547,
p. 94: 12-23

16

("That's one of the reasons why I think Judge Toomey was concerned that

there was non-disclosure, because it wasn't paid in the traditional course of where the
closing takes place then from the money that the seller received at the closing table, he
takes a part of that money and pays the agent a commission.").) Indeed, "common,"
lawful payments cannot serve as the basis for a $1 million judgment.
There is no escaping the fact that Seegmiller received a large, undisclosed, illegal
kickback from stolen funds for getting Plaintiffs to invest with Barnes, Valley View, and
Maxwell. This Court should avoid any policy construction that rewards and encourages

16

Mr. Roundy first used the term "secret commission" to describe Mr. Seegmiller's
$165,000 kickback at the August 13, 2015 hearing on the parties' Motions for Summary
Judgment.
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such deceptive, unlawful behavior and find there is no coverage because such an illegal

•

payment does not satisfy the Policy's "fee" requirement.
B.

Seegmiller acted dishonestly.

Even if Seegmiller's unlawful conduct was covered under the Policy's Insuring
Clause, which HC refutes, the Policy provides no coverage for the Herriman Litigation,
including Plaintiffs' judgment, because Seegmiller acted dishonestly.

The Policy

excludes coverage for any Claim or Claim Expenses " [b ]ased upon or arising out of any
dishonest, criminal, fraudulent, malicious or intentional Wrongful Acts, enors or
omissions committed by or at the direction of the insured."

17

(R. 2717, Section IV(a).)

Plaintiffs will likely contend the exclusion is inapplicable because they strategically
obtained summary judgment against Seegmiller in the Heniman Litigation with respect
to their "negligence" claim only. The facts, however, not Plaintiffs' legal theory, control

•

whether coverage exists. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389, 390 (Utah 1985) ("In
applying the policy's exclusion to the insured's conduct, the emphasis should be placed
upon the alleged activities or omissions of the insured which give rise to the claim and
not upon the claimant's characterizations of her legal theories of liability."); 9 COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 126:3 (3d ed. 2014) ("[T]he legal theory asserted by the claimant is

17

As the insurer, HC has the burden to prove the applicability of any exclusion. Quaker
State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 1278, 1312 (D. Utah
1994) (citing Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc., 77 1 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)).
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•

immaterial to the determination of whether the risk is covered."). 18 When this Court
examines the undisputed facts, it will be clear that Seegmiller's deceitful conduct and
misrepresentations to Plaintiffs, which Seegmiller used to induce Plaintiffs into investing
in the Highland and Herriman Transactions, are the basis of Plaintiffs' Claim and
judgment. 19 Indeed, the undisputed facts reveal that Seegmiller's purposeful, dishonest
conduct negates coverage.
The record is replete with undisputed evidence of Seegmiller's dishonest conduct.
For example, in the Herriman Litigation, Plaintiffs presented the following statements of

fact:

•

•

"The conduct of Robert Seegmiller did not meet industry standards for
treating the plaintiffs honestly, regardless of whether or not he was
representing them."

•

"The conduct of Robert Seegmiller did not meet industry standards that
prohibited Seegmiller from doing anything that would mislead plaintiffs ..
"

•

"The conduct of Robert Seegmiller did not meet industry standard [sic] of
full disclosure, which obligated [Seegmiller] to tell [Plaintiffs] all material
information which [Seegmiller] leam[ed] about the property or the seller's
ability to perform his obligations."

18

It is also important to note that under Utah law, dishonest representations, like
Seegmiller's, " 'are considered purposeful rather than accidental for the purpose of
insurance coverage.
The underlying rationale of this rule is that negligent
misrepresentation requires intent to induce reliance and, therefore, is a subspecies or
variety of fraud which is excluded from policy coverage."' Nova Cas. Co. v. Able
Constr. Co., 1999 UT 69, , 16, 983 P.2d 575 (quoting Dyksta v. Foremost Ins. Co., 17
Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 , 545 (Cal Ct. App. 1993)).
19

Plaintiffs' passing references to Prudential's alleged failure to properly supervise
Seegmiller are not at issue as Plaintiffs never obtained a judgment against Prudential and
Prudential never assigned Plaintiffs the right to pursue any claims on Prudential's behalf.
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•
•

The Herriman Transaction was a "dishonest . . . flip[,]" and Seegmiller
withheld infonnation about the " dishonest" nature of the transaction from
Plaintiffs.

•

(R. 3133-34, ~~ 27, 28, 31; 2779, ~ 23; 2786, ~ 23 (emphasis added).) That is, in
Plaintiffs' own words, Seegmiller lied to them to get them to invest in his personal real
estate deals.

Judge Toomey agreed, and consequently found Seegmiller liable for

''failing to disclose a personal interest in the transaction."

•

(R. 2909-11 (emphasis

added).) Since Seegmiller's dishonest conduct provides the basis for Plaintiffs' lawsuit
and judgment against Seegmiller, the Policy excludes coverage.
HC

expects

Plaintiffs

may

again

attempt

to

misrepresentations were the product of an honest mistake.

argue

that

Seegmiller's

Plaintiffs first made that

argument while briefing the underlying Motions for Summary Judgment when faced with
the cold truth that the Policy excludes coverage for dishonest acts.

(R. 5009.)

If

Plaintiffs revisit the argument, this Cami should reject their new-found classification of
Seegmiller's conduct. For starters, it is a self-serving argument that cuts against the
evidence and sworn statements Plaintiffs used to secure their underlying judgment in the
Herriman Litigation. See Fowler v. Mark McDougal & Assocs., 2015 UT App 194, ~ 6,
357 P.3d 5 (a party cannot contradict a prior statement without a clear explanation for the
discrepancy).

It also calls for the Court to ignore Plaintiffs' promise to "obtain

judgments against Mr. Seegmiller for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud" at trial if
Plaintiffs are unable to collect from HC; it is notable that, to HC's knowledge, those
claims remain pending. (R. 2961- 62.) Plaintiffs obtained their underlying judgment by
proving Seegmiller deceived them. That fact, not Plaintiffs' strategic pursuit of a select
36

•

•
legal theory in an effort to circumvent Policy exclusions, controls whether coverage

•

exists. As the Policy provides no coverage for Seegmiller's dishonest conduct, Plaintiffs
cannot use the Policy to fund their judgment.
C.

Seegmiller disclaimed any right to coverage.

Seegmiller's decision to actively disclaim coverage for years negates any potential
for coverage under the Policy now. Whether Plaintiffs stand as judgment creditors or
Seegmiller's assignees, HC may assert all defenses against Plaintiffs as it would have
against Seegmiller. First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P .2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980) (" [T]he
•

assignor cannot give another a larger right than he has himself."); Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co.

v. McGuire, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1208 (D. Kan. 2002) ("An assignee takes subject to
all equities and defenses existing between the assignor and the debtor prior to the notice
of assignment, but not those arising after notice of the assignment."); 7A COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 106:6 (3d ed. 2015) (" [T]he insurer can assert against the injured party all
defenses available to against the insured."). See also Section VIII(i) of the Policy ("Any
person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment
or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this Policy to the extent

of the insurance afforded by this Policy.") (R. 2722 (emphasis added).) That is, Plaintiffs
stand in Seegmiller's shoes.
Seegmiller, and thus, Plaintiffs, effectively waived any potential coverage under
the Policy and are estopped from obtaining coverage now. " [W]aiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right."' IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2008
UT 3,

1 16,

196 P.3d 588. It may be either express or implied. Id. Estoppel applies
37

when a party makes a statement or conducts himself/herself in a certain manner and
another party relies on it and would suffer harm if the first party was allowed to "take
back" its statement. Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ~ 14, 158 P.3d
1088. It is undisputed that Seegmiller failed to timely notify HC of the Highland and
Herriman Litigation and actively disclaimed coverage for years. Specifically, Seegmiller
waited over two years to notify HC of the Claim, which deprived HC of the opportunity
to meaningfully participate in the litigation. Further, prior to notifying HC of the Claim,
Seegmiller and Prudential omitted any reference to the Highland and Herriman Litigation
from multiple policy renewal applications. Finally, neither Seegmiller nor Prudential
ever challenged HC' s coverage analysis; in fact, Seegmiller agreed with HC's decision.
(R. 2643 , p. 169:1-13; 2644-45, pp. 176:4-177:11; 3186- 88; 3190- 92; 5689) Because
Seegmiller disclaimed any right to coverage at all times since 2007, Plaintiffs, now
standing in his shoes, are barred from using the Policy to satisfy their $1 million
judgment.

V.

HC DID NOT BREACH ITS DUTY TO DEFEND SEEGMILLER.
This Court need not decide whether HC breached its duty to defend Seegmiller in

the Herriman Litigation because Plaintiffs did not present it as an issue before this Court.

In their Statement of Issues, Plaintiffs ask this Court to do nothing more than determine
whether the Policy provides coverage for the judgment Plaintiffs obtained against
Seegmiller in the Herriman Litigation. That judgment has nothing to do with HC's duty
to defend under the Policy; it relates only to the damages Plaintiffs suffered as a result of

38

•

•
Seegmiller's dishonest conduct and therefore concerns only HC's alleged duty to
indemnify, which HC has shown was never triggered.
Even if the issue of whether HC breached its duty to defend Seegmiller in the
Herriman Litigation was before this Court, HC properly determined it had no duty to
defend Seegmiller. Under Utah law, " an insurer ' has a duty to defend the insured against
a liability claim which is covered or which is potentially covered."' Summer haze Co.,
L.C. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. , 2014 UT 28, 36, 332 P.3d 908 (quoting Mesmer v. Md.
Auto. Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1061 (Md. 1999)). Even if an insurer initially has a duty

to defend a claim, that duty ends once it is determined the claim is not covered under the
policy. E.g., Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Jackson, No. l:07-CV-00162, 2010 WL
2555120, at *8 (D. Utah June 21, 2010) (" [I]f ANPAC could establish that all claimed
bodily injuries arose from Michael's sexual misconduct, ANPA C's duty to defend would
end."); 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE§ 200:47 (3d ed. 2014) (" Generally, an insurer's duty to
defend arises out of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the conclusion of the
underlying lawsuit, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage.")
(emphasis added). From the moment HC received notice of the Highland and Herriman
Litigation, it was apparent there was no coverage. In his written notice to HC, McDonald
specifically stated the Highland and Herriman Litigation contained allegations "that Mr.
Seegmiller, . . . acting in his capacity as a Prudential agent and a principal in the

transaction, was part of a conspiracy that fraudul ently induced" Plaintiffs to invest
hundreds of housands of dollars in the Highland and Herriman Transactions. (R. 288890 (emphasis added).) That is, McDonald confirmed the litigation relates to deals where
39

•
Seegmiller did not act "solely" as a Prudential real estate agent and acted dishonestly.
Consequently, HC had no duty to defend Seegmiller. As Plaintiffs stand in Seegmiller's
20

shoes, Plaintiffs cannot claim that HC breached its duty to defend.

VI.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO GREATER COVERAGE THAN
THE POLICY AFFORDS SEEGMILLER.

•

Whether Plaintiffs stand as judgment creditors or Seegmiller's assignees 1s
irrelevant. That is, under no circumstances are Plaintiffs entitled to greater coverage than

•

the Policy affords under its plain and unambiguous terms. First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621
P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980) (as Seegmiller's assignees, Plaintiffs took the claims subject
to all applicable defenses); Mullin v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 541 F. Supp. 1219,
1224 (D. Utah 2008) Uudgment creditors cannot obtain coverage for a claim that is not
covered under the plain and unambiguous terms of the policy).

Judge Toomey

specifically found that whether Seegmiller was even acting as Plaintiffs' real estate agent
in the Herriman Transaction remains a question of fact. (R. 2909-11.) As such, the
Court may disregard Plaintiffs' argument that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Moreover, the undisputed facts, as demonstrated more fully above, show there is no
coverage under the plain and unambiguous terms of the Policy because (1) Seegmiller did
not act "solely" as a Prudential real estate agent in the Herriman Transaction, if at all,
(2) Seegmiller did not act "on behalf of' Prudential in the Herriman Transaction,
(3) Seegmiller did not receive or expect to receive a "fee" in connection with the
Herriman Transaction that would trigger coverage, (4) Seegmiller acted dishonestly, and
,.
20
See First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980); 7A COUCH ON
INSURANCE §106:6 (3d ed. 20 15).
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•

(5) Seegmiller waived and/or is estopped from seeking coverage now.

As such,

Plaintiffs, as both judgment creditors and Seegmiller's assignees, cannot recover under
the Policy.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendant Houston Casualty Company respectfully requests
that this Court affirm Judge Maughan's decision to GRANT HC's Motion for Summary
Judgment in its entirety and DENY Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED t h i s ~ day of May, 2016.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Rebecca Hill
One of the Attorneys for Appellee
Houston Casualty Company
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FU.HI IIITl!ICT CHRY
Third Judicial District

OCT 18 2011

wAecouHTY
. lly,_..,.<l)}'-"--~~..,_-._O.,..,.,.,pu"'"ty"'Clo"',.,-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNlY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM COMPTON, JOHN SIMCOX,
and SALTAIR INVESTMENTS, LLC,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ANO ORDER

Plalntiffs,
vs.

Case No. 070916209

•

ROBERT SEEGMILLER, STERLING
BARNES, UTAH COUNlY REAL
ESTATE, LLC dba'PRUDENTIAL UTAH
REAL ESTATg, VALLEYVIEW
ESTATES, LLC; SURETY TITLE
AGENCY, and JOHN DOES 1-20,

Judge Kate A. Toomey .

Defendattts.
This matter Is before the Court ·on the following.motions: (1) Plalritiffs Motion for
Pllrtlal,Summary Judgment Concerning Robert E. Seegmiller, filed May 9, 2011; (2) Robert
-Seegmiller's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed May 13, 2011; (3) Robert
Spegmiller's Motion to Strike, filed May 13, 2011; (4} Robert Seegmillei's Motion to
Amend, filed August 11, 2011; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment Concerning
Valley View Estates, LLC and Sterling Barnes, filed April 28, 2011; and (6) Sterling Barnes
aild Valley View Estates, Ll.,C's Motion for Summary Juqgrnent, filed April 13, _2011. The
motions were fully briefed, and oral arguments were held on A4gust 26 and August 29,

•
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•
•

•
2_011. The motions are now ready for decision. 1

BACKGR01,JND
In March 2006, Plaintiffs William Compton and John Simcox met Defendant Robert
Seegmiller, a real estate agent working for Prudential Utah Real Estate. The parties
discussed their common interest in developing· commercial land. Mr. Seegmiller showed

the Plaintiffs various properties for prospective purchase, provided them with information
about comparable sales, assisted with negotiations to purchase property, and drafted
documents on the Plaintiffs' behalf.

•

On September 21, 2006, Mr. Seegmiller Identified a promising parcel of real estatEI
in Herriman, Utah. On December 26, the Plaintiffs company Saltalr Investments, LLC
entered into a real estate purchase contract ('REPC") to buy the property from Defendant

•

•

Valley View Estates, LLC. The REPC required that Salt.air deposit $705,000 in earnest
money for the pqtential purchase of the lots. On November 29, 2006 and January 4 and

10, 2007, the Piaintiffs deposited the earnest money into an escrow account with Surety
Trtle Agency, per the terms of the REPC. The REPC provided that the earnest money
w0uld become non-refundable once the plat was recorded.
The REPC, Addendum 1, provides:
2, nie Buyer will secure their specific Lots or priority position with a
paid reservation deposit in the amount ofFIFTEEN THOUSAND dollars
($15,000) per lot by making a check or wire transfer payable to the
Sellers Title Company. Once the plat is recorded this money will
become non-refundable to the buyers.
3. As soon as the Lots are recorded the Buyer will be notified. No later
than t~n days after notification of reC?rdation of the final plat, each
1 Mr. Barnes and Valley View filed a Motion to Strike Affidavit of Thor Roundy.
The motion has not been submitted for decision and will not be addressed, ·

2
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•

J
reservation deposit will be converted to earnest money and this Real
Estafe Purchase Contract wm replace the reservation held on each Jot.
This purchase contract and addendum will identify the specific price
and settlement date. The Buyer will be notified by certified mail of the
recordation of the plat.
.
4. Buyer will close on all lots identified below thirty (30) days after any
adjustments per agreernerit and building permits can be issued by the

city.

•

.

On January 10, 2007, Defendant Sterling Barnes and Brett Redd, 2 owners of Land
D~velopment Alliance· ("LDA"), purchased the Herriman property for $7,458,500,
Defendant Valley View Estates, also owned by Mr. Barnes and Mr. Redd, then purchased
Iha property from LOA for $12,886,500. LOA "loaned" $5,609,162 to Valley View to pay .
the closing costs.. In fact, it was the Plaintiffs' escrow money that was deposited With the
same institution (Defendant Surety Title Agency) that was used to pay the closing costs:
Meanwhile, ANS Financial NA. agreed to loan Valley View over $16 million. Of that

•

money, $7 rnifllon was deposited with Surety Title Group for the purchase ofthe property,
. Land Development Alliance got $1.5 million, and Mr. Seegmiller and two other men got
$304,000 to share.
Valley View failed to develop the property pursuant to the terms promised by Mr.
· Barnes, and the Plaintiffs attempted to exercise their right to cancel the REPC and forego
purchasing the lots. However, Surety could not return the earnest money be·cause It had
released the money to.Valley View upon Sterling Barnes's request.
The Plaintiffs have brought causes of action against Mr. Seegmiller and Prudential.
for accounting, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and conspiracy. Against Mr. Barnes and Valley View, the Plaintiffs bring claims for

2

Mr. Redd is not a party to this action .

•
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-~
accounting, theft, fraud, and conspiracy.
DISCUSSION
There are four motions for summary judgment before the Court. The Plaintiffs move
for partial summary judgment against Mr. Seegmiller and Prudential on their claims for
breach offiduciary duty and negligence. Mr. Seegmiller and Prudential ffled a cross-motion
for _
s ummary judgment The Plaintiffs also ,:nave for summary judgment on all claims
against Mr. Barnes and Valley View. Mr. Barnes and Valley View filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment.
Summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact _and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

•

as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56{c). "A lriaf court is not authorized to weigh facts In
decidlng a summary judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of
material fact.exists, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom
in

alight most favorable to the nonmoving party." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County,

2002 UT 17, ,i ~4. 42 P.3d 379 (citation omitted). '"A genuine issue of fact exists where,
o·n the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ' on any material
Issue." Ron Shepherd Ins. Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 6_5 5 (Utah 1994) (citation
omitted).

Mr. Seeqmlller's Motion for Leave to Amend .
Mr. Seegmiller moves the Court for leave to amend his Memorandum in Opposition
to ~lalntiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. He
4
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oppose the motion, and the Court GRANTS the motion.

Mr. Seegmiller's Motion to Strike

Mr. Seegmiller moves the Court to strike certain paragraphs of the Affidavit of John
Simcox filed in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Mr. Simcox
testified as lo what Mr. Seegmiller said to co-Plaintiff Mr. Compton. Rule 56{e), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, requires affidavits to be made on personal knowledge. Mr. Simcox
do.es not have personal knowledge of the intentions and actions of his co-plaintiff, and the
Court GRANTS the motion as lo paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 of Mr.
Simcox's affidavit.

•

Claims against Mr, Seegmliler and Prudential
The Plaintiffs claim·thal between March 15, 2006 through early 2007, Mr Seegmiller
acted as their real estate agent and thus owed them certain_fiduciary duties. They also
argue that even if Mr. Seegmiller was not acting as their agent, he nevertheless breached
common law duties owed lo them.
Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Real estate agents owe fiduciary duties to their clients, including the duties of
diligence, loyalty, full disclosure, honesty, care, and good faith. See, e.g., Hopkins v.
Warriley Corp., 611 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Utah 1982). The Utah Administrative Code provides

that an agent owes, inter alia, the following duties: protect and pr:omote the interests of the
client ahead of oneself, loyalty, full disclosure of material lnfonnatlon, and reasonable care

s

•

•

•

•
and diligence,. The agent must provide a written agency agreement defining the scope of
··representation. Utah Admin. Code Rule 162.
The Plaintiffs argue that they believed Mr. Seegmiller was acting as their real estate
agent during the process of the Herriman property purchase, and they put their trust in him.
They claim that he breached an agent's fiduciary duties to his principals. For example,
they cite that he pfaced his own Interest ahead of theirs when he accepted a fee from
VaJJeyView; he did not provide discJ.osure of material information, especially details of the
"flip" sale; he failed to conduct due diligence on Valley View's financial status; he failed to
provide a written agency agreement or disclose in writing the scope of his representation;
ha failed to draft the REPC in a manner that prohibited Mr. Barnes and Valley View from
using the earnest f!Joneythe Plaintiffs had deposited with Surety; he fa fled to Include terms

•

in the REPC for the re tum of the earnest money; and he failed to supply Surety with a copy
of the REPC an·d Its escrow Instructions.
Before the Court can consider' the breach of fiduciary duty claims, it must determine
whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting as real estate agent for Mr. Compton and Mr. Simcox.
If Mr. Seegmiller was not their agent, _he does not owe the Plaintiffs the same duties a
fidllciary owes a client. The Utah Court of Appeals explains "agency:"
The key relationship between a real estate broker and a dient is
agency, and the universal laws applying to principals and agents
control their tights and responsibilities. Agency is the fiduciary
relation which results from the ma•nifestation of consent by one person
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
controi, and consent by the other so to act. Thus, for Welsh to show
WardJey was· his aQehl, he must prove that (1) he manifested that
Wardley could act for him; (2) Wardley accepted the proposed
undertaking, and (3) both Welsh and Wardley understood that Welsh
was to be In charge of the undertaking. In other words, an agency Is
created and authority Is actually conferred very much as a contract is
6
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•
made: a meepng of the minds must exist between the parties.
Moreover, an.d critical in this case, [a]n agency relationship can arise
only at the will and.by the act of the principal. ·
·

•

Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotc1tlons and
citations omitted).
The .Court first considers the evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs in favor of finding
an agency relc1tlonship.

The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Seegmiller •represented his

c~dentials to plaintiffs and told plaintiffs that he would represent them as a buyer's real
estate agent: .He showed potential Investment properties to. the Plaintiffs. and provided
them with sales data and Mµlilpie Listing Service ("MLS") info." Mr. Seegmiller drafted the
REPC for purchase of !he Herriman property on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and he did not
object Wheri another party filled in his name as the buyer's agent.

•

The Court .also considers Mr. Seegmiller's arguments against finding that he was
a~ng as a rear estate agent for the Plaintiffs. Mr. Seegmiller denies that he ever told the
Plaintiffs ·he would repr.esent them In any capacity; he denies filling .in his 'riame on the
·RePC as the Pl~intiffs agent;° and he argues that he was m~refy contributing his expertise
a~ a member of

a group of lnyestors. He raises the is.sue that the "broker" field in the

REPC wa·s left blaok,. where normally he.would write In Prudential; without the backing of
Prudential, he clai_m s that he could not legally represent Plaintiffs as their agent. Mr.
Seegmiller did not provide any sort _of agency contract to the Plaintiffs nor did he make
mention of any agent-client relationship. He acknqwledges that ha drafted the REPC
requirim{Plaintlffs earnest money to be deposited with-Surety but clalms that the Plaintiffs
negotiated the amount · of earnest money with Mr. Barnes, and Mr. Seegmlller only
fotmalized the agreement.
7
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•
The Court concludes that issues of fad remain whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting
as the Plaintiff's real estate agent Both parties submitted an expert affidavit. The
Plaintiffs' expert concluded that Mr. Seegmiller was acting as the Plaintiffs' agent, and Mr.
Seegmiller's expert opined that he was not. There is evidence supporting each position,
and on several contentions the parties plainly disagree as to the facts. Thls issue Is
therefore reserved for the jury as the trier of fact.
Claim for Negligence

Even if a real estatf:l ageht js not acting in the capacity of agent for another party,

he sbll owes certain duties to all parties to any transaction In which he is involved. Dugan

v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980).

Under the Utah Administrative Code Section

1e2-2f, an agent involved in a transaction must disclose in writing his agency relationships.

•

He must disclose In writing to all parties to the transaction any compensation he will
receive.
The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Seegmiller bte·ached his common law duties toward
thBm, including: failing to advise them to consult an attorney; failing to draft necessary
terms in the REPC; faillng to deliver a copy of the REPC to Surety; maintaining and hiding
a conflict of interest {by receiving money from Valley View); failing to obtaih escrow
instructions, failing to disclose in writing his agency relationships or any fees he might

.

.

collect; and concealing the fact that Valley View planned to remove the escrow money to
finance the purchase.
The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Seegmiller's failure to disclose material information
caused them to rely on his advice and deposit a large sum of money Into the escrow
account, which was then taken and used by Valley VieN. The Plaintiffs argue that Mr.
8
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•
Seegmiller breached his duties to the Plaintiffs, thus causing them harm.

•

Mr. Seegmiller argues that 'the breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims are
barred by the economic loss rule. The economic loss rule bars tort recovery for contract
claims. Where a contract exists, recovery is limited to the terms of that contract. .SM£
lntius., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, ,r 30, 28 P.3d

•

6$9. Mr. Seegmiller argues that the Plaintiffs' claims are based on a theory that there was
a quasi-contract between Mr. Seegmiller and the Plaintiffs, and therefore the Plaintiffs are
b~rred from bringing any tort claim outside the contract. 3
The economic loss rule.d~s not bar tort claims based upon duties independent of
thOse found in a contract. Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ,r 51, 70 P.3d 1.
When an independent duty exists, the rule does not bar tort claims based on a duty of

•

c.1re. Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,

,r 15, 48 P.3d 235 (holding that real estate

brokers owe a duty to pro·spective buyers to disclose material facts about the property).
The Court con.eludes that regafdless of whether Mr. Seegmiller was ·acting as the
real estate agent tor' Plaintiffs for the purpose of purchasing the Herriman lots, he owed
certain duties· to the Plaintiffs, which · he breached by failing to clarify his role in the
transaction, and failing to dlsdose a personal interest in the transaction.

3
Under the economic loss rule, a duty is owed only to the parties to a contract.
Tile "implied duty to use reasonable and customary care In the provision of professional
services arising from contract is owed only to the person or entity for whom the
professional services are to be rendered." SM£ Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett,
stalnbsck & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, 1J 30, 28 P.3d 669. The "economic loss rule"
provides thal one may not recover "economic" damages for a non-Intentional tort.
E¢0nomlc loss is defin.ed as: "Damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and
replacement of th.e defective product, or consequent loss of profits - without any claim
of.pei:sonal injury or damage to other property." Am. Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI
Mech., 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (citation omitted).

9
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•
Mr. Seegmiller, in his Motion for Summary Judgment, argues that he is not
personally liable for the alleged bad acts _because Prudential is liable for the acts of its
agents within the scope of employment authority. See Hadges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811
P.2d 151, 156-(Utah 1991) (an agent acting on behalf of broker is notliable for torts unless
he intended to be personally liable).. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a
supe1Visor may be l!able along with the agent.

Prudential's potential liability does not

for,ec)ose Mr. Seegmiller's Joint liability. AIi agent may be held liable for his own torts.
Brady v. Rooseveft SS Co., 317 U.S. 575, 580.

For the foregoing reasons, the Coor! DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim and GRANTS summary
judgment on the claim for negligence.

•

Claims agajnst'sterling

Barnes and Valley View Estate

The Plaintiffs and Sterling Barnes arid. Valley View have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on the cl?ims for theft, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
conspiracy,
The REPC, Addendum 1, discusses the Plaintiffs' earnest money:

2. The Buyer will secure their specific Lots or -priority position with a
paid reservation deposit in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND dollars
($.15,000) per lot by making a check or wire transfer payable to the
Sellers Title Company. Once the plat is recorded this money will
become non-refundable to the buyer,,
3·. As-soon as the Lots ·are recorded the Buyer will be notified. No later
than ten days after notification of recordation of the final plat, each
reservation deposit Will be converted to earnest money and this Real
Estate Purchase Contract will replace the reservation held on each lot.
This purchase contract and addendum will Identify the specific •price
and ·seftl~ment date. The Buyer will be notified by certified mail of the
10
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•

•
recordatioO of the plat.

4. Buyer will close on all iots identified below thirty (30) days after any

•

adjustments per agreement and building pennits can be ·issued bythe

dty.
(6.mphasis added.)
Th~ plat was n.ot recorded until March 6, 2007, but Mr. Barnes caused the escrow
rrwney to b"e rem.oved-fr()m the accou·n t ori January to, contrary to the tenns of the REPC.
The REPC proyides. that the eam(;lst money was to be held in escrow until closing, and
closing coµ)d hot have oe¢urted pn·or to September 7, 2007 (30 days after the city
authorized the permits). The Plaintiff)> were not notified by certified mail that the plats were
recotded. It was not until August 3 -whe·n the·Plaintiffs notified Valley View of their intent
IQ cancel the transaqlon :.. tnat they learned that the eame~t money had been taken
. months earlier.

•

Thsff/Convarsion

. i:nett occurs when a

person "obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the

prbpe"rty ofanotber With a J;>Ur'pose to deprlve him thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.
Toe Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Barnes (through Valley View) stole the Plaintiffs' $704,000
eqmest money deposit. The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Barnes was aware that he was not
ent,tied _to the esea:row i:noney; evfdenced by the fact that he did not provide a copy of the
REPC's escrow insti:uctiohs to Surety Trtle. Mr. Barnes also told the escrow officer thatthe
money was his own when it was·not.
Mr.. Barnes. first counters that there is no provision in the REPC prohibiting Valley
Vi~s use of the earnest money; The REPC provides: "No later than ten days after
ricitificatidn of recordaiion of the final. plat, each reserv~tion deposit will be converted to

JI

I

l

•

I

02912

•

•

....,

.

earnest money-[.r Clearly, the fact that the contract provides for how the m~mey shall be
used is an implicit message that the money may not be used for other purposes.

Mr. Barnes next claims that the Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for theft because

they did not have the earnest money in their-possession at the time it was taken. See
Flbro Trost, Inc. v; Broman Financial, Inc., 974 P.2d 288 (Utah 1999) (claimant must show
he was immediately entiU"ed to possession of the property at the time of the alleged theft).
This argument is unavamng. The Plaintiffs had the right to a refund of their earnest money
until the plats were rec.ordeci. Mr. Ba.mes took the money from the acco~nt prior to the
recording of the plats..
The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated sufficient evidence to
pmve the elements of theft. Mr. Sterling and Valley View unlawfully took the earnest

•

money, depriving the Plaintiffs of their property.

Fraud
The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Barnes (and Valley Vle"W) committed fraud by
misrepresentation. Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifies that claims of fraud
s!Jall be stated with particularity, The elements of fraud are:
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which the
representer either (a) knew to be false or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that there was lnsuff1eienl knoWledge upon which to
base such a representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it and (e) that the other party, acting
reasonably and In Ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely_
upon 1t (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) lo that party's
Injury and damage.

Aimed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 1116, 70 P.3d 35 (citations omitted).
First, the Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Barnes made false representations to Induce them
12 •
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The standard of proof for establlshing a claim of fraud is clear and convincing

•

evigence. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ,r 41, 5$ P .3d 524, 536. The
Court cannot detennine with certainty Mr. Bames's intent regarding the earnest money .
when he executed the REPC with the Plaintiffs. this detennination must be left to the trier
offacl .

•

The Plalntiffs ·rtext argue that Mr. Barnes committed fraud by misrepresentation
through non-disclosure, specifJCallythat he failed to disclose the following: the Defendants
were structuring the land safe ·as a "flip"; Mr. Seegmiller would be financially compensated
in return for convincing the Plaintiffs to deposit the earnest money; Mr. Barnes did not have
Iha financial means to develop ·the property as_he had represented; and the Plaintiffs'
earnest money had been taken and used for another purpose.
The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Barnes had a duty to speak because he was in a
sUperior posltlon to know the material facts around the purchase. Fraudulent concealment
requires a showing that one with a duty or obligation to communicate certain facts
remained silent or concealed material facts. •such a duty or obligation may arise from a
relationship

of trust between the parties, an inequality of knowledge or power between the

parties, or other attendant circumstances Indicating reliance[.]" McDougal v. Weed, 945
13

•

•

•

Proving fraud carries a heavy burden. _The Court determines that the Plaintiffs have
n111t established clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent concealment. There remain
is$ues of fact regarding what information Mr. Barnes actually passed on to the Plaintiffs.
The Court reserves this Issue for the jury.

•

Negligent Misrepresentation
Mr. Barnes kept the Plaintiffs apprised of the estimated time line for the development
project. Specifically, ha updated the Pfalntiffs In November and December 2006 and
Jcinuary 2007. The date of completion was material to the Plaintiffs because they hoped
to:resell the developed lots While the real estate market was high. Mr. Barnes told the
Plaintiffs that the lots. would be ready for resale as early as June 2007, but that was

•

•

Incorrect.
The Plaitrtiffs

now claim that Mr. Barnes did not have experience as a developer or

enough information to make such promises. Negligent misrepresentation occurs when:
(1) one having a pecuniary inte.rest in a transaction, (2) is in a
superior position to ·know material facts, and (3) carelessly or
negligently makes a false representation concerning them, (4)
expecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the
other party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that
transaction, the representer can be held responsible if the other
elements of f1pud are also present.
DeBry v. Ve/fey Mortg. Co., 835 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted).

Ne91igent misrepresentatio_n carries a lesser mental state than fraud, ·•requiring only that the
seiier act carelessly or negligently." Robinson v. Tripco Inv., !he., 2000 UT App 200, 1113,
21 P..3d 219.
The Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Barnes was in a superior position to know the facts
14

•

•
because he took it upon himself to keep the Plaintiffs updated on the project and he signed
the closing papers 0n behalf of Valley View. Mr. Sames disagrees that he was in a superior
position. It appears to the Court that Mr. Sames held himself out to possess pertinent
information that was·material to the Plaintiffs, and he passed along relevant information at
various times throughout the transaction. He was, to some extent, in a superior position
arid mad_e several misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs.

However, whether those

representations were negligent Js as yet uncertain. The Court does not have sufficient
information to determine whether Mr. Bames's representallons regarding the estimated
completion dat~ were reasonable. An incorrect guess is not necessarily negligent This
issue is left for determination by the jury.

Conspiracy

•

The Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Barnes, Valley View, and Mr. Seegmiller conspired to
coerce the Plaintiffs to execute·the REPC and deposit the earnest money into an escrow
ae¢0unt, which would then be used by Valley View to obtain a loan to acquire the Herriman
property.
Conspiracy requires the following elements: "(1) a combination of two or more
pemons, (2) an object to b·e accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or
co~rse of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximal~
reS1.Jlt thereof." Israel Pag_an £state v, Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The Plaintiffs claim that the theft of their money could not have occurred unless both
Mr. Seegmiller and Mr. Barnes failed to provide REPCs to Surety and Mr. Sames
misrepresented the source of th~ money to the escrow officer.
Again, the material facts are disputed and the Court cannot determine whether
15
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Seegmiller had a _meeting of the minds to defraud the Plaintiffs. Just because two steps

may be required to achieve a certain outcome does not necessarily mean that commission
of those two st_
eps was intentional ln relation to one another. .
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court: (1) DENIES in part (claim for fiduciary duty) and
GRANTS in part (claim for negligence) Plaintiff ' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Concerning Robert E. Seegmiller, (2) GRANTS in part (claim for fiduciary duty) and DENI ES
in part (claim for negligence) Robert Seegmiller's Cross Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, (3) GRANTS Robert Seegmiller's Motion to Strike, (4) GRANTS Robert
Seegmlller's Motion to Amend, (5) GRANTS in part (claim for theft/conversion) and DENI ES
in part (claims for fraod, negligent representation and conspiracy) Plaintiffs' Motion for

•

Suinmary Judgment- Concerning Valley View Estates, LLC and Sterling Barnes, and (6)
GRANTS in part (claims forfraud, negligent misrepresentation and conspiracy) and DENIES
.

.

in part (claim for thefl/conversion)Sterling Barnes and Valley View Estates, LLC's Motion for
Summary Judgment

DATED this l!day of October, 2011.
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The Order of Court is stated below:
/
....· / \
Dated: September 10, 2015
Isl PA UL -G ·MAUGHAN
01 :22:22 PM
Distric~Cciu;t;Judge /

· -. ~~t·,·~~:,,-~;·;f,/

KEITH A. CALL ( 6708)
ROBERT T. DENNY (13687)
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (80 l) 363-0400
Attorneys for Defendants Daniel J. McDonald
and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM COMPTON, and JOHN
SIMCOX, individuals, and SALTAIR
INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company,

FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART
AND DISMISSING CASE IN ITS
ENTIRETY WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 13090613 7
DANIEL J. McDONALD, an individual,
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC, a Utah
professional limited liability company,
HOUSTON CASUALTY COMPANY, a
Texas licensed insurance company and
JOHN DOES 2-10,

Judge Paul Maughan

Defendants.

Pending before the Court are the following motions:

1.

Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary

Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims.

I Error! Unknown document property name.OJ Error! Unknown document property name.002445007.1
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2.

Houston Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment.

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Houston

Casualty Company.
4.

Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary

Judgment re: Damages and Causation.
5.

Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment re: Breach.
The Court held a hearing on these motions on August 13, 2015. Thor Roundy appeared
on behalf of Plaintiffs.

Keith A. Call and Robert W. Lin appeared on behalf of Daniel J.

McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC (collectively, the "Lawyer Defendants").

Karl A .

Bekeny and Rebecca Hill appeared on behalf of Houston Casualty Company.
After careful consideration of the briefing submitted and the arguments of the parties
presented on August 13, 2015, the Court RULES and ORDERS as follows:
1.

Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for Summary

Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims is hereby GRANTED in its entirety. All
claims agai nst Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC are DISMISSED
with prejudice.
In this case, the Plaintiffs, William Compton, John Simcox and Saltair Investments, LLC,
have sued the Lawyer Defendants for legal malpractice. It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs never
had an attorney-client relationship with the Lawyer Defendants. Rather, they have taken their
claims for legal malpractice by assignment from the Lawyer Defendants' former client, Bobby
Seegmiller. The Lawyer Defendants' motion seeks an order that legal malpractice claims are not
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assignable as a matter of law, at least under the facts of this case.
In U.S. Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. U.S. Sports Specialty Ass'n, 2:07-CV-996-TS, 2012
WL 6624202, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 19, 2012), the United States District Court for the District of
Utah determined that the Utah Supreme Court would likely adopt the majority rule that legal
malpractice claims may not be assigned. In Sleepy Holdings, LLC v. Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Case
No. 120401523, (Fourth District Court, State of Utah), the trial court entered a Ruling on
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, Motion to Consolidate, and on Defendant Snell & Willmer [sic]
L.L.P. and Wade Budge's Motion to Dismiss on July 15, 2013. In that ruling, the Court found
that legal malpractice claims are not voluntarily assignable. In consideration of those cases and
the public policy considerations as outlined in Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d
389,397, 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. app. 1976), as well the policy considerations outlined in
the various other jurisdictions that prohibit the voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims,
this Court adopts the majority rule in this case and finds that legal malpractice claims are not
voluntarily assignable, at least under the circumstances of this case.
Specifically, the Court is persuaded that this case represents exactly why a majority of
jurisdictions in the United States have prohibited voluntary assignment of legal malpractice
claims.

For example, allowing voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims would

compromise a client's expectation of confidentiality and loyalty, along with the lawyer's duty to
provide the same. The Court finds that these policies have been violated here. For example, Mr.
Seegmiller, the "client" in the underlying case and the "assignor" of the legal malpractice claims,
has shared with Plaintiffs in this case attorney-client communications not only between himself
and the Lawyer Defendants, but also between his former co-client (Prudential Real Estate) and
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the Lawyer Defendants. Thus, the attorney-client privilege between Prudential Real Estate and
the Lawyer Defendants was violated.

In addition, allowing voluntary assignment of legal

malpractice claims would increase the risk that a client who was satisfied with his legal
representation would be exploited or coerced to invent and assign a legal malpractice claim in

•

order to get out from under a judgment entered against him. In this case, it appears that Mr.
Seegmiller had no intention of bringing a legal malpractice claim, but may have been unduly
influenced to assign and "cooperate" with Plaintiffs' pursuit of a malpractice claim to get out
from under a judgment that the Plaintiffs had obtained against him.

Even if confidential

information was not shared with Plaintiffs, and even if the former client was not exploited or
unduly influenced, the circumstances of this case show that the risk of such is real and that legal
malpractice claims should therefore not be voluntarily assignable.
The Court fmiher finds that to allow voluntary assignment of legal malpractice claims,
especially in view of the facts here, would pry apart, or risk prying apart, the attorney-client
relationship, would adversely reflect on the judicial process, and should not be encouraged.
At the August 13, 2015 hearing, Plaintiffs argued that the Court could allow them to
substitute Mr. Seegmiller as Plaintiff in this case, thereby resolving any concern with respect to

Mr. Seegmiller's voluntary transfer of his legal malpractice claims. In Botma v. Huser, 39 P.3d
538, 543 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals of Arizona invalidated an assignment of
legal malpractice claims. Just as here, the plaintiff in Botma argued that the assignor of the legal
malpractice claim should be able to continue to pursue the claim.

The Court held that the

assignor had "nothing to ' retain' in the present lawsuit, a lawsuit that can benefit only [assignee].
The purpose of the assignment agreement was only to allow [assignee] to recover any and all
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monies which might be owing to [assignor] and that [assignee] will be the ultimate beneficiary of
[assignor's] claims.

To allow the present lawsuit, which was born out of that assignment

•

agreement, to proceed in [assignor's] name would be to wink at the rule against assignment of
legal malpractice claims." id. at 543.
The Court finds this reasoning persuasive. Here, just as in Botma, there is no dispute that
Plaintiff is the ultimate beneficiary of the alleged malpractice claims. To allow this lawsuit,
which was born out of an invalid assignment, to proceed in Mr. Seegmiller's name, would be to
wink at the rule against assignment of legal malpractice claims.
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith
Haitvigsen's Motion for Summary Judgment re: Assignment of Legal Malpractice. The Court
DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Daniel J. McDonald and Smith Hartvigsen from the suit.
2.

Defendant Houston Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment 1s

hereby GRANTED in its entirety. All claims against Defendant Houston Casualty Company are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
In their Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege they are entitled, as both judgment
creditors and Robert Seegmiller's assignees, to recover $1,04 1,275.34 from Houston Casualty
Company as a result of Houston Casualty Company's decision to deny coverage for Robett
Seegmiller with respect to two underlying lawsuits in which Plaintiffs sued Robert Seegmiller,
among others.

1

On October 18, 20 11, the Court in the Herriman Lawsuit granted summary

judgment in Plaintiffs' favor and against Robett Seegmiller; Plaintiffs subsequently obtained a
judgment in the Herriman Lawsuit against Robert Seegmiller for $1,041,275.34 on June 7, 20 12.
1 The two underlying lawsuits are: Simcox, et al. v. Seegmiller, et al., Case No. 070916208, filed in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County (the " Highland Lawsuit") and Compton, et al. v. Seegmiller, et al., Case
No. 070916209, filed in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County (the "Herriman Lawsuit").

07409
September 10, 2015 01 :22 PM

5 of 10

Plaintiffs allege Houston Casualty Company is liable under one or more insurance
policies Houston Casualty Company issued to Utah County Real Estate, LLC ("Prudential")
from November 26, 2006 through November 26, 2009. 2 During that time, Robert Seegmiller
was a Pmdential real estate agent.

•

Pursuant to the HCC Policies ' Insuring Agreement and Endorsements 1 and 5 of the HCC
Policies, Houston Casualty Company agreed to provide insurance coverage to Prudential, and its
real estate agents while providing Professional Services "on behalf of' Prudential, "[s]olely in
the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker of non-owned properties, for others
for a fee." In her October 18, 2011 Memorandum and Decision in the Herriman Lawsuit, the
Honorable Kate Toomey ruled that "regardless of whether Mr. Seegmiller was acting as the real
estate agent for Plaintiffs for the purpose of purchasing the Herriman lots, he owed certain duties
to the Plaintiff [sic], which he breached by failing to clarify his role in the transaction, and failing
to disclose a personal interest in the transaction." Because Robe1i Seegmiller had a personal
interest, he held dual or competing roles in the transaction giving rise to the Herriman Lawsuit.
Robert Seegmiller cannot have held dual or competing roles in the transaction and
simultaneously have acted "solely" as Plaintiffs' real estate agent "on behalf of' Prudential. As
such, there is no coverage for Robert Seegmiller for the Herriman Lawsuit under the HCC
Policies as a matter of law.
Further, at the hearing Plaintiffs argued that pursuant to Section VIII(i) of the HCC

2 From November 26, 2006 to November 26, 2009, Houston Casualty Company provided Professional Liabil ity
Errors and Omissions Insurance to Prndential and its real estate agents under three successive policies that contained
the same material terms. Policy H706- l 7424 covered the Policy Period of November 26, 2006 to November 26,
2007; Policy No. H707-16855 covered the Pol icy Period of November 26, 2007 to November 26, 2008; and Pol icy
No. H708-l 6288 covered the Policy Period of November 26, 2008 to November 26, 2009 (the pol icies are,
collectively, the "HCC Policies").
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Policies, Plaintiffs, as judgment creditors, have a direct right of action against Houston Casualty
Company regardless of whether Robeti Seegmiller was covered by the HCC Policies. Section

•

VIII(i) of the HCC Policies states that "[a]ny person or organization or the legal representative
thereof who has secured such judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to
recover under this Policy to the extent of the insurance afforded by this Policy." The Couti finds
that pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of Section Vlll(i), Plaintiffs cannot obtain
greater coverage than the HCC Policies provide for Robert Seegmiller. The Court has ruled that
the HCC Policies do not provide coverage for Robert Seegmiller. Therefore Plaintiffs, whether
as judgment creditors or assignees, are similarly not entitled to coverage under the HCC Policies.
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Houston Casualty Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Houston Casualty Company
from the suit.
3.

For the reasons discussed in Section 2, above, the Couti DENIES Plaintiffs' Cross

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Houston Casualty Company.
4.

For the reasons discussed in Section 2, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and

DENIES-IN-PART Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's Motion for
Summary Judgment re: Damages and Causation.

The Court grants the motion as to the

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint that implicate insurance coverage with respect to
claims made against Bobby Seegmiller. To the extent there are allegations that do not implicate
insurance coverage with respect to claims made against Bobby Seegmiller, the Court denies the
motion as to those allegations.
5.

The Court DENIES Defendants Daniel J. McDonald's and Smith Hartvigsen's
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Amended Motion for Summary Judgment re: Breach.
In light of the Court's rulings contained in this Order, all claims against all Defendants
are being dismissed with prejudice.

This Order addresses a ll claims asserted against all

Defendants, and dismisses this case in its entirety, with prejudice. This constitutes the final order
of the Court.
---------------END OF ORD ER--------------*** Entered by the Court on the date indicated by the Court's Seal at the top of the first page***

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Date: September 8. 20 15

Isl Keith A Call
Keith A. Call
Robert T. Denny
Attorneys for Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and
Smith Hartvigsen, PLLC

Ill

Ill
Ill
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TUCKER ELLIS LLP

Date: September 8. 2015

•

Isl Karl A. Bekeny
Karl A. Bekeny, admitted pro hac vice
(Signature added by Counsel for Attorneys for
Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and Smith
Hartvigsen, PLLC with permission)

CHRJSTENSEN & JENSEN
Rebecca Hill
Attorneys for Defendant Houston Casualty
Company

Date: September 8, 20 15

Isl Thor Roundv
Thor Roundy
Attorney for Plaintiffs William Compton, John
Simcox and Saltair Investments, LLC
(Signature added by Counsel for Attorneys for
Defendants Daniel J. McDonald and Smith
Hartvigsen, PLLC with permission)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 81h day of September, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IN PART AND DISMISSING CASE IN ITS ENTIRETY WITH PREJUDICE , to be
electronically filed via the Court's GreenFiling system which will send notification to the
following:
Cory B. Mattson, Attorney
Thor Roundy, Attorney
801 North 500 West, Suite 150
Bountiful, Utah 840 10
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Rebecca Hill, Attorney
Christensen & Jensen
257 East 200 South, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Houston Casualty Company
Karl A. Bekeny, Attorney, admitted pro hac vice
Kevin M. Young, Attorney, admitted pro hac vice
Tucker Ellis LLP
950 Main A venue, Suite 1100
Cleveland, Ohio 44113-7213
Attorneys for Houston Casualty Company

Isl Cvnthia L. Worne
Legal Assistant

3376630vl
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September 10, 2015 01 :22 PM
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•
Return of Electronic Notification

•

Recipients
REBECCA L HILL - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13:23 : 13.423.
KEITH A CALL - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13:23: 13.36.
Cory Mattson - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13~23: 11.53.
THOR B ROUNDY - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13:23: 11.547.
ROBERT T DENNY - Notification received on 2015-09-10 13:23:12.61.

07415

•
... ••• IMPORTANT NOTICE· READ THIS INFORMATION . ,.,.
NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILI NG [NEFJ

A filing has been submitted to the court RE: 130906137
Judge:
PAUL G MAUGHAN

Official File Stamp:

09-10-2015: 13:22:29

Court:

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
District
Salt Lake

Case Title:

COMPTON, W ILLIAM, et al. vs. MCDONALD,
DANIEL J, et al.

Document(s} Submitted:

Order - Final Order Granting Motions for
Summary Judgment in Part and Dismissing Case
in Its Entirety With Prejudice

Filed by or in behalf of:

PAUL G MAUGHAN

This notice was automatically generated by the courts auto-notification system.

The following people were served electronically:
REBECCA L HILL for HOUSTON CASUALTY
COMPANY
ROBERT T DENNY for DANIEL J MCDONALD,
SMITH HARTVIGSEN PLLC
KEITH A CALL for DANIEL J MCDONALD,
SMITH HARTV IGSEN PLLC
CORY B MATTSON for WILLIAM COMPTON et
al
THOR B ROUNDY for WILLIAM COMPTON et al

The following people have not been served electronically by the Court. Therefore, if service
is required, they must be served by traditional means:
JOHN X DOE
JOHN IX DOE

07416

Addendum
Exhibit 3

•
CERTIFICATION

The undersigned hereby certifies that the attached Declarations, Endorsements,
Application and Policy Form (Professional Liability Errors & Omissions Insurance) combined
form a true, complete and accurate copy of Houston Casualty Company Policy No. H707-1 6865
as issued in favor of Utah Countv Real Estate, LLC OBA: Prudential Utah Real Estate OBA:
Prndentia1 Cres Commercial Real.Estate.

HCC Specialty
on behalf of Houston Casualty Company

/.)
,

1/ 1 • .

~

l ,1-),1\.J·:\ (..!,_: ,

\ / (.,(__u_J!..L"h .3'. . /

P auline Morley, Senio r Vi r -Prcsi<lenl
Autho1i zed Representati ve ,)

O

b r

4-

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2 C1 +~ay of
Ch c' 2 0 f
in
Mount Kisco , New York by Pauline Morley to me kno'Arn, and k nown to me to be an authorized
representative of HCC Specialty on behalf of U.S. Specialty lnsurance Company and who
executed the foregoi ng Certification, and who duly acknowledged to me that he did execute the
same.

Jill E. TORRES
NOTARY PUBLIC-STATE O F NEW VORK
No . 02106 134572
Q UQ.Jlll_et;l. In Weslc h eslef..C.oun!y
My Commission Expires

~µ}l\'6

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - -·-
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HO USTON CASUALTY COIVIPANY
ADMI NISTRATIVE OFFICES: 13403 NORTHW EST FREEWAY, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77040

DECLARATIONS
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ERRORS & OMISSIONS INSURANCE
THI S IS A CLAIMS MADE POLICY
Broker No ..

No.:
Renewal of:

9991146

TRI-CITY BROKERAGE, INC.
ltem1 .

Namedlnsured:

Item 2.

Address:

H707 - 16865

i-!706 - 17424

UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC DBA :
PRUDENTIAL 1.J'T.'Ai-i REAL ES'.I'A'I'E OBA :
PRUDENTIAL CRES COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
2 4 0 N OREM BLVD.
OREM , UT 84057

Item 3.

Named lnsured's Profession:

Item 4.

Li mit of Liability: $

Item 5.

Deductible:

Item 6.

Notice of Claim to:

Item?.

PolicyPeriod:

Item 8.

Retroactive Date:

Ite m 10. Premium :

$

See Endorsement fr 1 , E32

1,000,000

Each Claim and in the Aggregate
including Claim Expenses.
Each Claim incfuding Claim Expenses .

35 , 000

PIA, Director of Claims
37 Radio C ircle Drive, Mount Kisco, NY 10549
lnceptionDate: 11/26/07
Expiration Date:
11/26/08
i2:01 A.M. Standard Time at the address of the Named Insured herein.

8 / 01 / 0 l

$

Item 9.

Date of Application:

8/ 2 9/07

36 , 965 . 00 Administrative/Inspection fee . $50 . 00

- -- Item ·t--1-, Extens1cn-Peri0d;---l,--2--M:;.)J.-.f~f-H;3.-----·-·-·Itern ·12- & tension-Pereentage,-- -12-.5. :,, .;s~ • -

Attachments: (l)E32 , (2)E46, (3)El7 , (4)E l 27 , ( 5) El61, (6) E1 33, (7)El66 ,
(8)E34, (9)E109, (10)853, (ll)El74, ( 12) El92, (13)El93 .

c

U1...,0ic- L•' - .•·
.
,.!:•:T,,:Jrfl
•
.• ••. . •' 'f-<.i
. ver
/ ~
This Policy has been signed at

11/26/ 0 7

Dated _ _ _ _ _ 'rl,J _ __ __:__ _ __

MPL00l (09/06)

_ __

NJ

•••

- I

RCM

ORIGINAL
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•
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
ERRORS & Ofv1JSSIONS INSURANCE

, .1;:J

(This Insurance Is On A Claims Made Basis)
THIS POLICY IS LIMITED TO LIABILITY fOR ONLY 11-lOSE CLAIMS 11-lAT ARE FIRST MADE AGAINST THE
INSURED DURING THE POLICY PERIOD. DEFENSE COSTS REDUCE THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY PROVIDED.
PLEASE REVIEW THIS POLICY CAREFULLY WITH YOUR INSURANCE BROKER OR ADVISOR.
In consideration ot the payment of the premium, the undertaking of the Insured to pay the Deductible herein and

in reliance upon all statements made and Information In the appllcatlon, Which is attached hereto and made a part
or this Policy, and subiect to all the terms and conditions of this Policy, the Company agrees with tile Insured as
follows:

I.

•

COVERAGE
Coverage.Payment and Claims Mad& Provlsfon
The Company shall pay on behalf or the Insured any Loss and Claim Expenses In excess of the Deductible
amount and s·ubject to the Limit of Llability as the Insured acting In the profession descri>ed in Item 3 of the
Declarations shall become legally obligated to pay tor Claim or Claims first made against'ttie Insured during
the Poficy Period by reason of any Wrongful Act by an Insured provided always that the Insured has no
knowledge ot such Wrongful Act prior to the Inception Date of this Policy and further provided that such
Wrongful Act took piace subsequent to the Retroactive Date set forth In rtem 8 of the Declarations.

II.

DEFINITIONS

Whenever used

in this Policy, the following terms or words are defined as follows:

a) Policy Period
"Policy Period" shall mean the period lrom the Inception Date ol this Policy to Its Expirailcn Date as sel
forth in Item 7 of the Declarations or its earlier termination date, if any.
b) Insured
"Insured" or "Insureds" shall mean
1) The Named Insured as designated in Item 1 of the Declarations;
2) Any par~er, executive ofllcer, director or employee of tile Named Insured while acting within"1he sc:ope
-·-··--··-ol their dutlr~s ort bet,all .of.ll11:..Named.lnsured;_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..................... ---··-·-······-- -·-·- . ·-• _. - · ---······-·····-·
3) Any lorrner partner, executlve officer, director or employee ot the Named Insured \vhile acting within
the scope of their duties on behall ot the Named Insured;
4) The estate, the heirs, assigns or legal representatives in tile event of death or incompetency of arry
individual Insured under this Polley.

440073 (1/98)
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•
c)
. .J

Claim

"Claim" shall mean a demand received by the Insured for compensation of damages, including the service
al suit or institution of arbitraiion proceedings against the Insured.
d)

Loss

"Loss" shall mean a monetary judgmert, award or settlemen1 lor damages including an a-,.-vard by a court
of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a party making Claim, but does no1 include fines , penalties or
any matter uninsurable under the Law pursuant to which this Polley will be construed, nor the return ot tees
or charges for the services rendered or to be rendered.
e) Wrongful Act
"Wrongful Act" shall mean any actual or alleged error or omission or breach o1 duly committed or alleged
to have been committed or for failure to render such professional services as are customarily rendered In
the profession of the IP.sured as stated in Item 3 of the Declarations.

I)

Cl~im Expenses
"Claim Expenses" shall mean ( 1) fees charged by an attorney designated by the Company and (2) all other
tees, costs or expenses incurred in the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of a Claim i1 incurred
by the Company or an attorney designated cy the Corrpany, or by the Insureds with the written consent of
the Company. However, "Claim Expenses" do not include salary charges of regular employees or officers
of the Company nor salary or wages of the Insureds, nor any tees, cos1s, or expenses Incurred with respect
to any criminal proceedings or _actions ~gainst an Insured.

Ill. CLAIMS MADE EXTENSION CLAUSE

If during the Policy Period, the Insured first becomes aware ot any specttic and identifiable Wrongful Act and
during the Policy Period gives written notice to the Corrpany of:
a) the· specific Wrongful Act; and
b) the damage which has or may rE7sult from such Wrongful Act; and
c) the circumstances by which the Insured first became aware of such Wronglul Act;
then any Claim that Is subsequently made against the Insured arising ou1 of such Wrongful Act shall be
deemed for the purposes of this insurance to have been made against the Insured during the Policy Period.

IV. EXCLUSIONS

Tfi1s Po11cy"aoes not apply either d1rec.'t1y or 1nclffecfly to any Cla1rn ancrClalm Expenses:
a) Based upon or arising oul of any dishonest, criminal, fraudulent, malicious or inlentional Wrorigtul Acts,
errors or omissions committed by or at the direction of the Insured.

Page 2 of 8
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•
•

b) For ilabllily arising out of the lnsured's services andior capacity as:
1) an oHicer. director, partner, trustee, or employee oi a business enlerprise not named in the
Dedaraiions or a charitable organiza1io11 or pension. weifare, pro1it sharing, muiual or investment tune
or trust;
2)

c)

•

a fiduciary under 1he Employee Retirement Income Socurity Act of 1974 and its arnendmams or any
regulaHon or order issued pursuant thereto, or wilt1 respect lo any employee bonafit plan ot an Insured.

Made by any business enterprise wr1lch is operated, managed or cwn0d, in whole or in part, by the Named
lnsur2<J or the Named lnsured's parent cr.irnpany or any affiHat~d, subsidiary or associate company.

d) Arising out of infringe,nent ot patent, copyright or 1rademarl<:
e) For bodily injury, sickness, disease or death of any person, or for emotional distress, mental anguish, or
other similar injury or damage, or any injury to, or destruction of, any tangible properly er loss of use
resulting therefrom.

t)

Ar\sing out of false arres:, tiumiliation, dete11tion or imprisonment, wrongful entry or eviclior. or other
invasion of private occupancy, or malicious prosecution, libel, slander or other defamatory or disparaging
material, or a publication or an utterance in violation of an individual's right of privacy.

g) Based upon or arising out of discrimination with respect to a violation of any municipal, State or Federal
Civil Righ1s law, regulation or ordinance.
h) Based upon or arising out of a violation or allogoo violation cf the Sec:uri!ies Act Of 1933 as amended, or
the Securities Exchange Ac-~ of 1934 as amended, or any State Blue Sky or securities law or sirnilar state
or Federal statute and any rogula!ioo or order issued pursuant to any of tha foregoing statutes, unless
endorsed hereon.
I)

For the liability of otflers assumed by the Insured und\3, any oraJ or written cM!ract or agreement, unless
such liability would have at!ached to Hie Insured even in 111$ absence of such agraemem.

i)

Based upon the lnsured's failure !o procure or maintain adequate insurance or bonds, or any Claim arising
out of the lnsured's failure to r..ornply with any law with rsspect lo !he lnsured's employees concerning
Workers' Compensation, Unemployrner.t Insurance, Social Security or Disability Benefits or any similar
law.

k) Based upon the Employee Retirement Income Se--.;urify Act ol 1974 or similar provisions ot any Federal,
State or local statt.Jtory law or common law.
·

- - - - - - - -1)

.fnr..ac!t1al-Or-"'1i16ged.violatioA-Of-,ll~9--fiaGk8l08r-lnthJOf1GG<l-and-COf'.r.upt-Organi;rntion~-Act, ..:18-.U.S.C..§...196'1.et seq., and any amendments th ereto, or any rules er regulations prom.ilgated thernunder.

- .

rn) Based upon assertions, allegations, causes of action or demands whatsoever by or on behalf of an insured
or Insureds under this Policy agnin.,it a11other Insured or !n.sureds hereunder.

Page 3 of B
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•

n)

Baseq upon the actual or alleged pertormance or the failure to perform by the Insureds any professional
services· as an attorney, or the actual or alleged per1orrnance or failure to perform any professional
services as an attorney by any person or entity retained or err,ployed by the Insureds.

o)

Due lo, based upon or arising out of, directly or indirectly, resulting from or in consequence
way involving seepage, pollution or contamination of any kind.
·

ct, or in any

V. WAIVER OF EXCLUSIONS AND CONDITIONS
Whenever coverage under any provision ot this Policy wou!d be excluded, suspended or lost:
a} because of any exclusion relating to dishonest, criminal. fraudulent, mallcious or intentional Wrongful Acts
or omissions by an Insured and with respeci to which any other Insured did not personally participate or
personally acquiesce or remain passive alter having personal knowledge thereof: or
b) becaust3 of non-compliance with any condition relating to giving of notice to the Company with respe0 to
which any other Insured shall be In defauh, solely because ot lhe detault or concealment of the default by
any other Insured responsible for the loss or damage otherwise insured hereunder;
the Company agrees !hat such insurance as would otherwise be afforded under this Polley shall continue In
effect with respect to each and every lnsureq who did not personally commit or personally acquiesce in or
remain passive alter having personal knowledge ot one or more o1 the acts or omissions described in any such
exclusion or condition; provided that if the condition be one with which such Insured can comply, after receiving
knowledge thereof, the Insured entitled to the benefit of this Wa°Ner of Exclusions and Conditions shall comply
with such condition promptly after obtaining knowledge of the failure of any other lnS1.Jred or employee to
comply therewith.

VI. LIMITS OF LIABILITY
a)

Deductible
The Deductible amoulil stated in the Declarations shall be paid by the Insured and shall apply to each
Claim and shall include Claim Expenses.

b)

Multiple Claims
One or more Claims based upon or arising out of the same Wrongful Act or interrelated Wrongf~I Acts by

one or more of the Insureds shall be considered a single Claim.

c) Limit of Liability
Subject to the foregoing, the Company's total llabllity for Loss including Claim Expenses resulting from all
Claims lirstmade_ag ainsLllle lnsurcds.rlliring the. P.clicy Period.shall nol exccc.d the amounl statedJn.the
Declarations as "Limit of Liability," regardless o1 the time when such payment Is made. The Inclusion of
more than one Insured hereunder shall not operate to either Increase the amount of the applicable
Deductible nor the amount of tile Co~any's Urrit of Liability. The Limit of Liability shall be excess of !ha
Deductible amount.

Page 4 of 8
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d) Exhaustion ol Limits of Liability
The Company will not be liable to pay any Loss or Claim Expenses or continue the defense of any Claim,
after the L!mil of Liability has been exhausted.
e) Allocatlon o1 Claim Expenses
In the event that any portion of a Claim does not come within the coverage afforded by this Polley, the
Company shall be entitled to an allocation of Claim Expenses incurred on behalf or the Insureds based
upon the ratio of the nurrber of counts, causes or action or allegations for wh ich coverage Is afforded under
this Policy as compared to the number or such counts, causes of action or allegations which are not within
the scope of coverage. The Company shall not be required or obligated to pay that portion of Claim
Expenses allocated to these counts, causes. ct action, or allegations which are not within the scope al
coverage herein.

VII. TERRITORY
The insurance aHorded applies worldwide, provided that suit is brought or Claim is made within the United
Stales. tts territories and possessions or Canada.

VIII. CONDITIONS
a) tnsured's Dulles In the Event of Claim, Arbitration or Sutt

1) In the event of any Claim made against the Insured, written notice containing par1icurars sutticient to
identify lhe jnsured and also reasonably obtainable int9rmatlon with respect to the time, place and
circumstances th ereof, and the names and addresses ot the injured and of available witnesses, shall
be given by or tor the Insured to the firm named in Item 6 of the Declarations as soon as practicable.
2) If the institution at arbttralion proceedings or suit Is brought against the Insured, the Insured shall
Jmmediately forward to the firm named in Item 6 of the Declarations every demand, notice, summons
or other process received by the Insured or his representative.
b) Assistance and CooperaUon

ot ttte Insured

The Insured shall cooperate with the Company and its representatives and upon the Company's request
shall submit to examination and interrogation by a representaUve of the Company, under oath if required,
and shall altend hearings, depositions and trials and shall assist in effecting settlement, securing and
giving evidence, obtaining the attendance at witnesses and in the conduct of suits, as well as in the givjng
of a written statement or statements lo the Company's representatives and meeting with such
representatives for the purpose of lnvestigalion and/or defense, all without cr.arge to ttie Company. The
Insured shall fur1her cooperate with the Company and do whatever Is necessary to secure and effect any
rights or indemnity, contribution or apportionment which the Insured may have. The Insured shall not,
- - - --

=xc:·epi··~t·-~.~:.r-& ..·,-,, GG;117"·i.,-t~1{t~· U":ry~~tii,¼
1'!"'.:><ti¾ n,r~m:t- ~.-i7~H1.,~t1ttyt.aa+t~a-lf·-.1-}'1'· G:atn,u , ~-:.}:Ju.--m..-·t1:i y-~·!igQ~!',5~1

-c,-----

incur any expense without the written consent or the Company.
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c) settlement of Claim
The Compa'ny shall not settle any Claim without the consent of the Insured. If, however, the Insured shall
refuse lo consent to any settlement recommended by the Company and shall elect to oontest the Claim or
continue any legal proceedings in connection with such Claim, then the Compa·ny's liability for the Claim
shall not exceed !he amount for which tile Clalm could have been so settled plus Claim Expenses incurred
up to the date of such refusal. Such amounts are subject to the provisions of Clause VI, Umlts ot liability.
d)

Audit
The Company may examine and audrt the lnsured's books and records at any lime during the Policy Period
and after the final termination of this Polley, as far as they relate to the subject matter of this Polley.

a) Subrogation
In the event of any Claim or payment under this insurance. the Company shall be subrogated to the extent
of such payment to all rights of recovery lheretor, and the Insureds shall execule all papers required and
shall do everything that may be necessary to secure such rights. including !he exea.nion of such
documents necessary lo enable the Company to elfeciively bring suit in the name of the Insureds. The
Insureds shall do nothing after Claim is made against them to prejudice such rights. Any recovery shall
first be paid to the Company to the extent of any Loss or Claim Expenses paid by the Company, with the
balance paid to the Insured. However, no subrogation shall ~e had against any Insured unless such
Insured is excluded from coverage by reason of Exclusion IV (a).
f)

O1.tler Insurance
This Policy shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectable insurance availc!ble to the
Insured whether such other insurance is staled to be primary, contributory, excess, contingent or
otherwise, unless such other insurance is written only as a specific excess insurance over the Limit of
Liability provided in this Policy.

g) cancellation
This Polley may be cancelled by the Named Insured by surrender thereof to the Company or by mailing
written notice stating when thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. JI cancelled by the Insured, Iha
Company shall retain the customary short ra1e proportion at the earned premium. This Policy may also be
cancelled, with or without the return by tender of the unearned premium, by or on behalf of the Company
by delivering to lhe Named Insured at the address set forth in tlhe Declarations or by sending to the Named
Insured by mail, registered or unregistered, at the address in the Declarations not less than thirty (30) days
(or ten (10) days in the event of non-payment ot premium) written notice stating when the cancellation shall
be effective. If cancelled by the Company, the Company shall retain Iha pro rata portion of the e·arned
premium. For the purpose ct this Polley, notice of cancellation given to the Named Insured by lhe
Company or given to the Corr,pany by the Named Insured pursuant to this paragraph shall be deemed to
be notice on behalf or all Insureds hereunder.
If the period ot l'lmifalion relaling to the giving of notice 1s prohibited or made vold by any law controlling

_.the cons.1~r;c:tion liereot sl1Ch. periQ.d. st.Jal! Q.e_deeme.d to be amended_lJo ~s _lg_ bE? eqt,Jal to_Jt1eJT)_inimym
period of limitation permitted by such law.
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•

. .• •~t

h) Extension of Policy Period
In the evenl of cancellation or non-renewal of this Policy in its entirety by the Company, this Policy may be
extended for the additional period as indicated In Item 11 of the Declarations, for a premium based upon
the percentage as indicated in Item· 12 of the Declarations 01 the total premium, for Claims first made
against lhe Insured during the said extension period provided:

•

1) The Wrongful Act giving rise to such Claim Is committed or alleged to have been committed prior to
the effective date of the cancellation or the original expiration date, whichever is applicable, and which

would be otherwise Insured by this Pc/icy; and
2) Written notice ot the exercise of this option is given by the Named Insured in Item 1 ot the Declarations
to the Company within ten (1 O) days after the effective date of cancellation or non-renewal; and

-3) Such additional period shall be deemed part of the expiring Policy Period and not an add~ion there to;
and

4) For purposes of such additional period, coverage shall be applicable only with respect to Claims first
made against the Insureds during such additional period. The provisions of Clause Ill ot this Policy
shall not be applicable to such additional period.

•

The quotation of a renewal premium higher than the expiring premium or a change in other terms or
conditions shall not be deemed to be a cancellat"ton or non-renewal by the Company.
i)

Action Against the Company
No actlon shall lie against the Company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, there shall have been
full compliance with all o1 the terms of this Policy, nor until the amount of the lnsured's obligation to pay
shall have been finally determined ei1her by judgment against the Insured afler actual trial or by written
agreement ot the Insured, the daimart and the Cofll)any.
Any person or organization or the legal representative thereof who has secured such judgment or written
agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this Policy to the exlent ol 1he insurance afforded
by this Policy. No person or organization shall have any right under this Policy to join the Company as a
party to any action against the Insured to determine the lnsured's Oability, nor shall the Company be
impleaded by the Insured or his legal representatlve. Bankruptcy or insolvency at the Insured or ot the
tnsured's estate shall not relieve the Company of any of its obligations hereunder.

j)

Assignment
No assignment of interest under this Policy shall bind lhe Company unless its prior written consent is
erdorsed hereon.

k) Changes
- - -- - - ---,Notn.:e to or kiiowlifdgs "possessed by any age1ircJroy<li'iy 0'1ffeqrnnr:in-srra,t-rra~ e:,~ r:r-a-warv.;r0,·:,
change in any part of this Polley, nor estop the Company from asserting any•righl$ undhr ~h~ Jecms of this
Policy. The terms ot this Policy shall not be waived or changed, except by endo,~errp;,1~Jssued to form a
part ot this Policy, signed by an authorized representative of the Comp3D\i) ·.. ,:. ·
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•

I}
>0 : 1

Application
By acceptance of this Policy, the Insureds agree that the statements in the application are personal
representations, that they shall be deemed material and that this Policy is issued in reliance upon the truth
of such representations and that this Policy embodies all agreements existing between the Insureds and
the Company or any of their agents reiatlng to this insurance.

m) False ot Fraudulent Claims

II any Insured shall commit fraud In proffering any Claim as regards amount or otherwise, this insurance
shall become void as to such Insured irom the date such fraudulent Claim Is proffered.

.\
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Endorsement
NAMED INSURED:

UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC OBA: et al

NAMED INSURE0'S PROFSSSIONAL DESCRIPT ION ENDORSEMENT
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood
and agreed that Item 3 of the Declarations, the " Named Insured's
Profession", shall read as follows:
3.

Named Insured's Profession:
Solely in the performance of services as a Real Estate Agent/Broker
of non - owned properties, for others for a fee.

•

All other terms and conditions remain unchanged.
Endorsement

effective: 11/26/07

Endorsement No.

HMP Policy No . H707 -16865

1
Professi onal , Inde~n ity Agency, Inc .

by
.
(Auth o rized Representat i ve)

•

HMP E-32

•
__________________

__,,

•
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Endorsement
Named Insured : UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA : et al
NUCLEAR H!CIDENT EXCLUSION CLAUSE - LIABILITY - DIRECT (BROAD)
In consideration of the premium charged , it is understood and agreed
that this Policy of Insurance does not apply :
I.

Under any Liability Coverage, to injury, sickness , disease, death
or destruction
(a) with respect to which an insured under the policy is also an
insured u nder a nuclear energy liabil i ty policy issued by
Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association, Mutual Atomic
Energy Liability Underwriters or Nuclear Insurance Association
of Canada, or would be an insured under any such policy b ut
for i t s termination upon exhaustion of its limit of liability;
or
(b) resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear materia l
and with respect to which (1) any person or organization is
required to maintain f inancial p r otection pursuant to the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or any law amendatory thereof, or
(2) the insured is, or had this policy not been issued would
be, entitled to indemnity from the United States of America ,
or any agency thereof , under any agreement entered into by the
United States of America, or any agency thereof, with any
person or.organization .

II.

Under any Medical Payments Coverage , or under any Supplementary
Payments Provision relating to immediate medical or surgical
relief, to expenses incurred wi t h respect to bodily injury,
sickness, disease or death resulting from the hazardous
properties of nuclea r material and arising out of the ope r ation
of a nuclear facility by any person er organization .

III . Under any Liability Coverage, to injury , sickness, disease , death
or destruction resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear
material, if
(a) the nuclear material (1) is at any nuclear faci lity owned by,
or operated by er on beha l f of, any insured or (2) has been
discharged or dispersed therefrom ;
(b) the nuclear material is contained in spent fuel or waste at
any
time
possessed,
handled,
used, processed ,
stored ,
transported or disposed of by or on behalf of an insured; or
- - - -- - (, --e-t-+:-f:-e-i-f-:--1+.H~.:t,--ci-:-~e-k-F. ·:.~ ~J-:i·--·~...:-:--- --- ,---c! e .:,..l:--f::--:::, r--- --,:.J'::!•:=· t=..-r;.,t:~•:.:. 4~i -:=.,.r!---=:--1:·-:t-:=-•,=:, :.i-~i::_1-1=-:- - - - -

of the furnishing by an insured of servi ces , materials, parts
or equipment in connection with the planning , construction,
maintenance, operation or use of any nuclear faci lity, but if
such facility is located within the Uni ted States of America,
its territories or possessions or Canada , this exc l usion (c)
applies only to injury to or destruction of property at such
nuclear facility.
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NUCLEAR INCIDENT EXCLUSION, Continued

IV .

Page 2 of 2

As used in this endorsement :

" hazardous properties" include radioactive, toxic or explosive
properties; "nuclear material" means source material, special nuclear
material er: byp.roduct material ; "source material", " special nuclear
material" , and " byproduct material" have the meanings given them in
the Atomic Energy Act 1954 or in any law amendatory thereof; "spent
fuel'' means any fuel element or fuel component , solid or liquid, which
has been used or exposed to radiation in a nuclear reactor; "waste "
means any waste material (1) containing bypr oduct material and (2)
resulting from the operation by any person or organization of any
nucl ear faci l ity included within the definition of nuclear facility
under paragraph (a) or (b ) thereof ;" nuclear facility" mea n s
(a) any nuclear reactor;
(b) any equipment or device designed or used for (1) separating
the isotopes of uranium or plutonium,
( 2) processing or
utilizing spent fuel , or (3) handling, processing or packaging
waste ;
(c) any equipment or device used for the processing, fabricating
or alloying of special nuclear material if at any time the
total amount of such material in the custody of the insured at
the premises where such equipment or device is located
consists of or contains more than 25 g.r.ams of plutonium or
uranium 233 or any combination thereof, or more than 250 grams
of uranium 235 ;
(d) any structure, basin, excavation , premises or place prepared
or used for the storage or disposal of waste;
and includes the site on which any of the foregoing is located, all
operations conducted on such site and all premises used for such
operations;
" nuclear reactor " means any apparatus designed or used to
sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain reaction or to
contain a critical mass of fissionable material . With respect to
injury to or destruction of property, t h e word "injury" or
" destruction " includes all forms of radioactive contamination of
property .
It is understood and agreed that , except as specifically provided in
the forego-1.ng to the contrary, this clause is subject to the terms,
exclusions , conditions and limitations of the Certificate of Insurance
to which it is attached.
It is further understood and agreed that this Policy has a 25%
minimum earned premium condition .
1
.". ' 1 ·~ the ~- ti:: ~'H.S-a-n ~! ·: ::, r,.,:,i-:i:-~l➔H-S-r ~:·ii ·,.:i,-H- u r: ::hi>-·R
..-E~reE·:1:---- --

Endorsement effective 11/26/07
Endorsement No .
2
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-

- - - - - --

HMP Policy No . H707-16865
l?rofess i
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by_ _..:.,t.' ,Vf
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- - - --

:.1.-:lemni ty Agency, Inc.
,

~-

;;J

.../

·. ~,';-, ,

-~. ,:--;,·'·
~? ,:~.. P·, ,-:) ..~i·•r:t
·:. t:· ...1 V· 1~,
(ALI th
. ,.-'. . ";.-;
· ' ...
-· ~ '.
, "" I .,,I
... ,)- ·-~
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Endorsement
NAYIED INSURED:

UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE ,

LLC OBA: et al

In consideration of the premicm charged , it is he ceby u nderstood and
ag reed the section of t:he Policy entitled "II . Defi:-iitions,
part e) , Wrongful Act" , is a mended to include the following:
With respect t o the Insured ' s profession as sta ted in Item 3 of the
Declarations , WRONGFUL ACT shall also mean any actual or alleged :

•

1.

Libel , sl ander or other forms of defamation ;

2.

I~vasion or infringement of the right of privacy or publicity;

3.

Plagiarism, piracy or misappropriation of ideas under implied
contract .

It is also understood and agreed that Exclusion "f" of this Policy
is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:
fl

to a ny claim and claim expenses arising out of (1) false arrest ,
detention or imprisonment ;
(2) wrongful entry or evictions , or
invasion of any right of private occupancy .

It is furt he r understood and agreed that this Policy does not
apply :
1.

to any clai~ and claim expenses arising out of or connected
with the performance of or failure to perform services as an
insurance agen t ,
insurance broker ,
mo rtgage banker, mortgage
broker , escrow agent, property developer , builder, construction
manager: , or property manager ;

2.

to any claim and claim expenses arising out of any Insured
~aking warranties or guarantees as to any future value of any
property;

3.

to any claim and claim expenses ar i sing out of notarized
certification o= acknowledgement of a signature without the
physical appearance at the tine of said notarization before
such notary public as insured hereunder of the person who is or
claims to be the person signing ;
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4.

to any claim and claim expenses arising out of or connected
with any transaction in which any Insured has a direct or
indirect beneficial ownership interest
as a buyer or seller of
real property; however, this exclusion does not apply to re-al
property to which any Insured has taken legal title solely for
immediate r esale and has entered into a written contract to
se l l not later than ninety (90) days after taking legal title ;

5.

to any claim and claim expenses arising out of or connected
with the formulation,
pr·o motion,
syndication,
offer, sale or
management of any limited or general partnership or any interest therei n.

•

All other te r ms and conditions remai n unchanged .
Endorsement effective 11/26/07
Endorsement No.

HMP Policy No .

H707 - 16865

3

Professional Indemnity Agency, Inc.

by
(~uthor lU~d Repre sentative )
HMP E- 17

----------------------------- - - - - - - --·-•-•·•--·---·• -

"'

-··--- - - - - - -- -- - - -

•

,.,,.,

__________

- - - - --
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•
NA.~ED INSURED :

UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC OBA: et a l

ORGANIC GROWTHS EXCLUSIONARY ENDORSEMENT
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood and
agreed that this Policy s hall not apply to and no coverage will
be afforded for any Claim, including any Loss or Claim Expenses ,
which, either in whole or in part , directly or indirectly, is for ,
based upon , relates to , or arises out of the formation, growth ,
presence, release , dispersal , containment , removal, testing for ,
or detection or monitoring of any molds, fungi, spores, or other
similar growths or organic matter, including but not limited to
aspergillus , penicillium, or any strain or type of Stachybotris ,
commonly collectively refer r ed to as the "Black Molds ".
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged.

Endorsement effective 11/26/07
Endorsement No .

HMP Policy No . H707 -1 6865

4
Professiona l Indemnity Agenc y , Inc .
, I

i

:·

by_----,_ _.._;--c---=--- - - - , - - - - - ,,----c--

{Author i

t~ d Represen tativ e)

H.t"lP E-127
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·-

-··· ··"·"-·--------·-- - - -

.

--··-------·- - -
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NAMED INSURED : UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA : et a l
In consideration of the premium charged , it is hereby understood
and agreed that coverage afforded by this Policy i s hereby extended
to provide property damage arising from the use and ope~ation
of a lock box . A $25,000 sublimit shall apply for the lock box
coverage afforded in this endorsement . This sublimit of liability
is part of and not in addition to the limit of liability stated in
Item #4 of the Declaration Page .
It is further understood and agreed that the section of this Po l icy
entitled " IV . EXCLUSIONS, part o) " shall net apply to claims based
upon or arising cut of Wrongful Acts invol ving the Insured ' s
failure to disclose the existence of pol lutants. A sublimit
of Liability of $500,000 in the aggregate shall apply to
this coverage . This sublimit of liability is part of and not.
in addition to the limit of liability stated in Item #4 of the
Declaration Page .
It is further understood and agreed that the Independent Contractors,
of the " Named I nsured " , are covered solely for their Professional
Services provided on behalf of the Insured; but only if the
Professional Services of the Independent Contractor(s) are the same
as those set forth in Item 3 of the Declarations Page and in
Endorsement No . 1 of this Policy .
It is further understood and agreed that exclusion g), of this
Pol i cy is deleted in its entirety , solely with regards to civil law
suits that seek monetary damages . These civil law suits cannot be
brought by er on behalf of any cu r rent or former partner , executive
officer , director or employee of the Named Insured.
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged .
Endorsement Effective : 1 1 /26/07
Endorsement No . :

Policy No . : H707 - 16865

5

2rofessh'ln;~1l J.nqemn.ity Agency , Inc .

··.•~}·/./

by ··-·---····(···A;,;····u·····t h.o... r;.,-:-ed RepresenFat.IveY
.L.:

HM!? E- 161

····-·--···- ··--··-····

- - - - -· - - · - ·-·- .. - - -- -- -
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Endorsement
NF~ED INSURED:

UTA~ COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA : et al

In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood
and agreed that the section of this Policy Titled "VIII .
CONDITIONS", part h) , Extension of Policy Period is deleted
in ir.s entirety and replaced with the following:
h) Extension of Policy Period
In the event of cancellation or non- renewal of this Policy in
its entirety by the Company or the Insured , this Policy may be
extended fer the additional period as indicated in Item 11 of the
Schedule, for a premium based upon the percentage as indicated in
I~em 12 of the Declarations of the total premium, fer Claims first
made against the Insured during the said extension period provided :
1) The Wrong=ul Act giving rise tc such Claim is committed or alleged
to have been committed prior to the effective date of the cancel lation or the original expiration date, whichever is applicable,
and which would be otherwise insured by this Policy; and
2) Written notice o: the exercise of this option is given by the
Named Insured in Item 1 of the Declarations to the Company within
ten (10) days after the effective date of cancellation or n onrenewal; and
3) Such additional period shall be deemed part of the expiring
Policy Period and not an addition thereto ; and
4) ?or p u r~ose s of such additional period, coverage shall be applicable
only with respect to Claims first ~ade agai~st the Insureds during
such additional period. The provisions of Clause III of this
Policy shall not be applicable to such additional period; and
5) The limit of liability applicable to the Extended Discovery Period
shall be or-ly the remaining limit cf liability available under
the Policy and no additional limit of liability shall be
applicable; and
The quotation cf a renewal premium higher than the expiring premium
or a change in other terms or conditions shall not be deemed to be
a cancellation or non - renewal by the Company .
All ether terms and conditions remain unchanged .
Endorsement effective 11/26/07
Endorsement No.

HMP Policy No . H707 -16865

6

Pro=essi .:-1i al Ir1?em1:i ty Agency, Inc.
' . ' - ..
' .,
by_ _ __;__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(Authori zed Representative)

HM2 E- 133
£133
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NAMED INSURED :

•

UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC OBA: et al

In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood
and agreed that this Policy shall not apply to and coverage shall
not be afforded for any Claim and Claim Expenses based upon or
arising out of the sale, management, lease or rental of any Real
estate located in the state of California .
All other terms and conditions remain unchanged .

Endorsement effective 11/26/07
Endorsement No .

HMP Policy No . H707-16865

.. ,

7

!

'

HMP E- 166

. ............ ......... ..........

___

..,_.. , .......... ......... ··- · - - --
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•
NA.MED INSURED:

UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC OBA : et al

PENDING/?RIOR LITIGATION ENDORSEMENT

In consideration of the premiu~ charged , it is hereby understood and
agreed that this Policy excludes all claims and claim expenses
arising from all pending or prior litigation, as well as future claims
arising out of said pending or prior litigations .

All other terms and conditions remain unchanged .

E~dorsement effective 11/26/07
Endorsement No .

HMP Policy No. H707 - 16865

8

Professional Indemnity Agen cy, Inc .

. . .,.,.
by_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
(Authod zed Representative)

HMP E- 34
E34
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NAME',D INSURSO : UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE,

LLC OBA: et al

Sl~RVICE OF SUIT CLAUSE

As used in this endors ement, the "Company" refers to Houston Casualty
Company .
This applies in jurisdictions where the Company is not an admitted
insurer.
It is agreed that in the event of the Company's failure to pay the
amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Company , at the request o f the
Insured, will submit to the jurisdiction of any court of competent
jurisdiction within the United States and will comply with all
requirements necessary to give such court jurisdiction and all matters
arisi ng hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law and
practice of such court .
It is further agreed that, pursuant to any statute of any state,
territory or district of the United States which makes provision
therefore, the Company hereby designates the Superintendent,
Commissioner or D1rector of Insurance or other offic er specified for
that purpose in the statute, or his successor or successors in office,
as its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served any lawful
process in any action, suit or proceeding instituted by or on behalf
of the Insured or any benefic i ary hereunder arising out of this policy
of insurance, and hereby designates the President of the Houston
Casualty Company in care of the General Counsel, at 13403 Northwest
Freeway , Houston, TX , 77040, as the person to whom the said
officer is authori zed t o mail such process or true copy thereof .
It is further understood and agre ed tha t service of process in such
E,ui t may be made upon JAY SIM.MONS , Attorney-In-Fact , at
13403 Northwest Freeway, Houston , TX, 77040 , and that in any suit
i nstituted against any one of them upon this contract , Underwriters
will abide by the final decision of such Court or of any Appellate
Court in . the event of an appeal.
Al l other terms and conditions remain unchanged .
Endorsement Effective : 11/26/07
Endcrsement No . :

Po licy No .: H707-16865

9
Professional Indemnity Agency, Inc.
by

(Authbrized Repreaentati v~)~
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Endorsement
NJlJ1ED I NSURED:

•

UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC DBA : et al

In consid e ration of the premium charged , it is hereby understood
and agreed that a Retroactive Date of 11/01/05 in lieu of 8/01/01
sha l l apply to the following Named Insured :
PRUDENTIAL CRES COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE

All other terms and condit i ons remain unchanged.
Endorsement effective: 1 1/26/07
Endorsement No .:

HMP Policy No . : H707 - 16865

10
Professi9 al

Indemnity Agency, Inc .

by

(Autho rized Represr= r:tativc )
HMP E-53

___ ,_,,.

______ . ··· - ··-·· ·- ····· ······---· - - - - - - - -
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NAMED I NSURED ; UTAH COUNTY REAL ESTATE, LLC OBA: et al
In consideration of the premium charged it is hereby understood and
agreed that Section IV. EXCLUSIONS is amended to include the
following:
This Policy does not apply to and the Company shall not be liable for
Damages and/or Claims Expenses resulting from any claim made against
the Insured :
P . for, based upon, or arising from any alleged unsolicited sending
of information by fax , electronic mail (e- mail), or via any other
means where prohibited by law.

All other terms and conditions remain unchanged.
Endorsement effective : 11/26/07
Endorsement No . :

Policy No . : H707-16865

11
Professional. Indemnity Agency, Inc .
by:
(Authori zed Representative)

HMP E-174

-------•--·-·..- - - - - -
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NAMED INSURED : UTAH COUNTY REAL CSTATE, LLC OBA : et al
In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood
and agreed thac Section VI. LIMITS OF LIABILITY is amended to
include the following :
f) Supplemental Payment s
The Company will pay ~he reasonable expenses incurred , including
actual and provable loss of waqes , if the Insured is required by
:he Compar.y t o attend proceedings or trial in the defense of a
covered Claim . Such payments are subjec t to the f ollowing :
1 ) The maximum reimbursement for such expenses shall not exceed
$250 per day f or each Insured who attends such proceedings at
t he Company ' s reques t ;
2) The Company ' s max i mum total liabi l ity f or rei mburs ement shall
not exceed $5 , 000 per Claim regardless of t he n umber of
I n sureds who attend such proceedings at the Compan y ' s
request; and
3) Such payments shall be pa r t of and shall reduce the available
Limit of Liability .
Solely for t h e purposes of this Endo rseme n t , t h e Deducti ble amoun t
applicable co each Claim shall n ot apply to the supplemental
payments made by the Company under this subsection of the Policy .
All other terms and conc'ii:.ions remain uncha n ged .
Endorsement Effective : 11/26/07
Endorsement No . :

Pol~cy No . : H~07 - l6865

12
Profession,¥1 Indernni ty Agency , I n c .
by

( AuthorV' ed Rep r e s ·e n : ..:iti·v·c,n·
HMP E- 192
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•

NAMED INSURED : UT.AH COUNTY REAL ESTATE , LLC DBA : et al

In consideration of the premium charged, it is hereby understood
and agreed that Section II . DEFINITIONS, pai:-t b), is amended to
include the following :
5) The lawful spouse of an Insured (as set forth in items 1 - 4
above) in any Claims made against such spouse solely by reason
of spousal status or ownership interest in marital property/
asset s that are sought as recovery for such Claim, but only if
Claim does not allege any Wrongful Act or omission by such
spouse .

All other terms and conditions remain unchanged .
Endorsement Effective : 11/26/07
Endorsement No.:

Policy No .: H707 - 16865

13
Profe:3s : ,· i· , l

Indemn:i.ty Agency, Inc .

by
(Authoi/.1. zed Represent.at:~)
HMP E: - 193

- - - - - - - - -.. - ·=····· -·· ·

- - ..... ·••·· - ---•-·· • - ~ - - - - -
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APPLICATION FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY ERRORS & OMISSIONS INSURANCE
IF COVERAGE l S ISSUED, fT WILL SE ON A CLAIMS-MADE BASIS
NOTICE: THIS INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVIDES THAT THE LIMIT OF LIABILITY AVAJLABLE TO PAY
JUDGEMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS SHA LL BE REDUCED BY AMOUNTS INCURRED FOR L EGAL DEFENSE.
FURTHER NOTE THAT AMOUNTS !l'JCURRED FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SHALL BE APPLIED AG.O.INST TKE

DEDUCTIBLE AMOUNT.

1.

c/6-q /7,,-~,,.,-'"''"" ;c( t't!W, J,,.,.-i,L6,:.64,f:_
NAME OF APPLICANT: Jj/.-,J, , ,·,c1,,?,_ >0d'°&.,6..i.t:.~ i.!{ ./ {,!:i_/.:.~,_,:.t/,c_{_ ,:.•,i~:,;_..?,_,tt.1_,,,:!ieLitL/2?? ~~
ADDRESS:

2.

UMIT OF LIABILITY DESIRED:
$500,000 - - -

3.

✓

$2,000,000 -

-

-

Other_ _ _ __

DEDUCTIBLE:
$5,000_~
✓-

4.

S1 ,000,000

$10,C00 _ __

$25,000 _ __

Other _ _ __ _

Pleas6 describe in detail the professional activilies for which coverage is desired:

- - -'-=f.'. r:•z.~~(&.!.l.l.a.l..Lf-c·,,, e;-·, · ,••,:'.r-1.L.L.r.1.at:!._ C2t•-;•1Y

(u.5,:.,:'/2=
•-:.;;':."-'
_,.."""':,;;-<"'ec.__
J;
_ __

_ __

t?'z,

5.

Is the appllcan1 engaged In any business or p rofession other than as described in Item 4?
If yes, p lease at tach an explanation and estimated revenues.

6

Lisi lhe total gross ;evenues for the past two years derived from th ose activities in Question 4. In addition,
pleAse list projected rt'lvenues for the curr~nt year.

a I Current Projected
b)

_ZL:OG._

t,1PL 10190

Page 1 of 4
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7.

For the revenues listed in question 6a), please give the approximate percentage derived from each oi the
activities listed in Question 4:
·
ACTIVITY

% OF 6a) REVENUES

JI[,

%

1¥

%

_ _ __ %
____ %

8.

Applicant is: Corporation _ _

9.

Year Established: _ __,!:c.
.··.c-:r,,
.:.·'·-'-'-'-· '/ _ _ __ _

10.

Is the Applicant Firm controlled, owned or associa1ed with any other firm, corporation or company?
YES_:::_No_ _ . If yes, attach an explanation. Ara any activities listed In Question 4 provided to such
business enterprise? YES_ _ N O ~

Partnership _

,P,4'.,-;--M.6'4/ k-ct G;kk TrJ,MM.u'¢(

'I/./% of f4 l!,
11.

_

L-l.f:.~

!,'.!!rn'a<-,:.; pf' .~r/cP,1

Individual

~c-

<P~ $

t..t. C

a) N umber of pr1nclpals, partners. officers and professional employees direcily engaged in providing

2-?c:,

---

services to clients:

b) Number of non-professional employees (clerks, secretaries, etc.):

12.

Please provide the following:
Name in full of ALL
Partners/Principals/
Key Employees.

HOW LONG AS
PROFESSIONAL
QUALIFICATIONS

DATE
QUALIFIED

. .lit:t:.-~P.·r:. _ .

13.

HOW LONG IN
PRACTICE

PARTNER/
PRINCIPAL

__/_z. l ' . ~ -

To what protessionai associallon(s) does the Applicant Firm belong?

tt/a4

('::"-'..z~3/-tf"ifi £Y:-h:.6'b:l_J!~!?.('"'21'"$_ __ . - ·-

-

·-- - - - -

Page 2 of 4
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14

Please include a list of Applicant Firm's five (5) largest jobs or projects during the past three (3} years. Please
give, in detail: 1) project/client name; 2} the nature of the services performed for the client; and 3) 1he
revenues obtained from those services.

I I,

I,;:,:,,,.-,

,.q.,.r./.·/

Gi'

.;;9.·

.. -fe:,,,~_i..,_f
,-h·,·1 · ,
/
"'-'-'"'-'-...L..-15.

'1 ?£:, S ':,.{)

3 7?, ?./f

t?,;:_;;:_1~/,.;•;:,, u.0 .~-'-·- - -?~Yf!!+.!d.9-,~ ~Ll..c.1:1:!,~c-l_ __ J._t•~
-t_~-;k 7 ta·,;;
-

-

-

-

- -- --

l !."'•,_; /de,:;1..i.i>:il
-'-="'---''--'-'
'-'-

?..C/P, (:,,!:p

-'i.:..r:.13.:l.~----..L!u~ao
-----"'

Does the Applicant Firm use a written contract with client?
___ Sometimes

_ L In all cases

Never

Please attach a copy of your standard contract(s}.

16.

•

What percentage of the Appl!cant Firm's business Involves subcontracting of work to others? _ _ %. Does
the Applicant Firm provide professional services to business entitles in which 11retains an ownership interest
Yes
No __L. If yes, please explain.

--------------------·-------- - - - - - -- -- -· --17.

-------- - --- --

Has any similar insurance ever been declined or cancelled? Yes ....L_ (lf yes, attach explanation.) No _ _.

C'~ceel-cd FJv- le-~?
18.

-

k/i;~

~r ,Pd.'/.ect'<F'!;Ur 1;cl'~✓e./ &P#t

~,.-1

_,q?/r""'y:

Is similar Insurance currently in fores? Yes~ No _ _
If yes, please provide:
Description of services being covered:

Expiration Daie:

//...-Z4 =-C~'.....7_ _ _ _ _ Prior Acls/Aelro. Date: _ _ Yd~-- _
Deductible: $ __ 25L..Q/.ZQ __

_ __

Premium:$_ ___ , _____

Length ot time coverai:ie has been In force: _._S_jt~ae'!,

19.

Anach most recent aud1leo iin.;ncial statemen1s (or recent lax returns) and descriptive or promotional rnatarials.

{B) Estimated Cost ol Goods Sold lor current fiscal period· $_[5_,_~ 'f;O,.. ~

-

-

Page 3 of 4

02741

20.

Have any of the individuals listed in question No. 12 ever been the sucject of'disciplinary action by authorities
as a resutt of their professlonal activities? Yes _ _ No .....:.!::C_ If yes, please explain.

- ··-· ···------·----··----··-·--···-----

- ---------

- ..

•

- ·-

-------··--·-·

21.

Does any person to be Insured have knowledge or information ot any act, error or omissi.on which might
reasonably be expected to give rise to a claim against him/her. YES _ _ N O ~ If yes, please complete
a Supplemental Claim lnfonnation fonn for each.

22.

After Inquiry have any claims been made against any proposed lnsured(s) during the past three (3) years?
Yes _L__ No _ _ _ If yes, please complete a supplemental Claims Information form lor each claim.
Also. how many claims have been made in the last three (3) years? ~ ~ ~ d / . ~ ~ ( £__

It is understood and agreed that with respect to questions 20, 21 and 22 above, that if such knowledge or
information exists <1ny claim or action arising therefrom ls excluded from this proposed coverage.
NOTICE TO NEW YORK APPLICANTS: ANY PERSON WHO KNOWINGLY ANO WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD
ANY INSURANCE COMPANY OR OTHER PERSON FILES AN APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE CONTAINING
ANY FALSE INFORMATION, OR CONCEALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MISLEADING, INFORMATION CONCERN•
ING ANY FACT MATERIAL THERETO, COMMITS A FRAUDULENT INSURANCE ACT, WHICH IS A CRIME.
The Applicant hereby acknowledges that he/she/it is aware th at the limit of liability shall be reduced, and may
ba completely exhausted, by the costs of legal defense and, ln such even!, the Insurer shall not be liable for the
costs of legal defense or for the amount or any judgemnnt or settlement to the extent that such exceeds the limit
of liability.
The Appllcant hereby turther acknowledges that he/she/it is aware that legal detense costs that are incurred shall
be applied against the deductible amount.

I HEREBY DECLARE that, alter inquiry, the above statements and particulars are true and I have not suppressoo
or misstated any material fact and that I agree that this application shall be the basis o! the contract with the
Underwriters .
.. }ig~a,~ .re of p~-~on authorized to execute on behalf ol the Applicant:

r -··
,~,
., ~0·

. : :.-Ft~
.i.;. --:-__________

I·

...., ·· ·
.. ,.. .•~:?.?_?;!'?),

\

(,

!

.---~

Till8

,&(1?'11...13.S,;;-~·it-

~.Z.f- 07----

Date _____

'i1;,:;-Kpplicalion Form duly completed, together with any supplemenlary information, must be signe:.! in ink by Iha
person indicated.
Signing oi this lorm do~s

110 1

tJi11d the Applicant or the Ur1c.Jerw111~rs to complete the insuranca.

TJ-:iI$_AP.ELLQATION

MW.ST B~ SUBl'\!11:rT~lQ;

, ·:·iOFESSIONAL INDEMNIU i:,.:;;:r-:(;'/, INC.
~'Y(lt:i=SSIONAL INDEMNITY Af:,,.:,,1r.Y. INC OF N.Y.
37 Radio Circ;le Drive· P.O. Bo~ 5000
Mount Kisco, New York 10549-5000
Allantion: Edward D . Donnelly, CPCU
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